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The initiation of dividend payments has been shown (Asquith and
Mullins [1983]) to convey significant new information regarding
management’s expectations of future cash flows and the firm’s ability to
support future dividend payments,
relevant to firm-valuation.

and is therefore perceived to be

This study seeks to extend earlier work on

the "information content of dividend initiations" by empirically
examining whether dividend initiations of similar magnitude have
differing implications for firm-valuation depending on the firm’s
information environment.

Specifically,

the objective of this

dissertation is to empirically test whether the magnitude and volatility
of security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement is
associated with the firms information environment.

Since,

information environment is not directly observable,

six firm-specific

characteristics are used as proxy measures.
size,

the firm’s

The six proxies are firm

percentage of institutional holding in the firm’s equity,

number of institutions holding the firms equity,
following,

the dispersion of analysts’

the

the number of analysts

earnings forecasts and the

correlation between firm-earnings and macro-economy wide earnings.
study also attempts to statistically identify the firm-specific
vi

The

characteristic(s) which best explain(s) the magnitude of security price
reaction at the time of dividend initiation.

In general,

the results

indicate substantially higher price reaction to dividend initiation
announcements for "low" information environment firms relative to
"medium/high" information firms with respect to the market
capitalization,

percentage of institutional equity holding,

institutions holding firm-equity,
proxies.

For these proxies,

number of

and number of analysts following

the "event period" volatility of security

returns also increases sizeably relative to the estimation period for
"low" information environment firms.

Similar increases in "event period"

volatility are not found for the "medium/high" information environment
firms with respect to the market capitalization,

percentage of

institutional equity holding and number of institutions holding
firm-equity proxies.

The results also indicate that firm size and the

percentage of institutional equity holding are perhaps the most powerful
explanatory information environment proxy variables amongst the ones
examined in the study.

vi i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

iv

ABSTRACT.

vi

LIST OF TABLES.

x

Chapter
1.

2.

INTRODUCTION.

1

1. 1
1.2

The Dividend Puzzle: An Overview.
The Study.

1
6

Chapter 1 Endnotes.

10

BACKGROUND LITERATURE.

11

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

3.

Chapter 2 Endnotes.

36

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES.

37

3. 1
3.2

37

3.3
3.4

4.

Informational Effects of Dividend Initiations.
Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment:
Price Effects.
Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment:
Volatility Effects.
Conclusion.

38
44
46

Chapter 3 Endnotes.

47

SAMPLE,

48

4. 1
4.2
4.3
4.4

5.

The Dividend Policy Question. 11
Dividend Signalling Theory. 15
Empirical Evidence of Dividend Signalling. 22
Differential Information. 29
Conclusion. 34

DATA AND METHODOLOGY.

Sample Selection Criteria. 48
The Dividend Expectation Model. 50
Data Sources for the Information Environment
Proxy Measures. 52
Summary. 55

Chapter 4 Endnotes.

58

METHODOLOGY :

59

5. 1
5.2
5.3
5.4

A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS.

The Analyses of Returns. 59
Regression Analysis. 63
Analysis of Volatility. 65
Conclusion. 66

Chapter 5 Endnotes.

vi i i

67

6.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6. 1

6.2
6.3

6.4
6.5

69

Analysis of Returns. 69
6.1.1
Abnormal Returns Study for Overall Sample. 69
6.1.2
Information Environment Proxy Data Portfolio
Formation and Abnormal Returns. 71
6.1.2.1 Percentage of Institutional Equity
Holding. 72
6. 1.2.2 Market Capitalization. 78
6.1.2.3 The Number of Institutions Holding
Firm Equity. 84
6.1.2.4 Estimation Period Market Model R2. 92
6. 1.2.5 The Number of Analysts Following. 98
Analysis of Volatility.110
Regression Analysis.115
6.3.1 Analysis with Actual Values of Event Period SCAR....115
6.3.2 Analysis with Absolute Values of Event Period SCAR..123
6.3.3 Analysis with the Positive Event Period SCAR
observations.126
Post Dividend Initiation Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts.129
A Comparative Evaluation of the Proxies.130

Chapter 6 Endnotes.135

7.

RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS.138
7. 1
7.2
7.3

Summary of Findings.138
Contribution of Study.141
Avenues for Further Research.145

Chapter 7 Endnotes.148
APPENDIX:

SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND LITERATURE.149

BIBLIOGRAPHY.161

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table.Page
1. TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS
MADE BY THE SAMPLE OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE
PERIOD 1976-1987.
2.

49

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT PROXY
VARIABLES, NAMELY 7. OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST),
MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST),
IN THE CONTEXT OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS BY
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-87.

56

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-87.

70

A PROFILE OF PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING IN 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT.

72

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

74

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND
MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO
10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH 0-107. INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY
OWNERSHIP (THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP).

76

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 33
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY OWNERSHIP
RANGING FROM 10.47, TO 697, (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH 7,
INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP).

77

8. A PROFILE OF THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION (IN DOLLAR MILLIONS)
OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE
PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

79

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

x

9. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

10.

81

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR*)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 39
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION RANGING FROM
$ 9 MILLION TO $ 100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET CAPITALIZATION
GROUP).

83

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION RANGING FROM
$ 100 MILLION TO $ 4,000 MILLION (THE MEDIUM AND LARGE MARKET
CAPITALIZATION GROUP).

85

A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY IN 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT.

86

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING
THE FIRM’S EQUITY.

88

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND
MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO
10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 35
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING
EQUITY UPTO 10 (THE LOW NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP)...

89

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING
EQUITY RANGING FROM 11 TO 215 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP).

91

16. A GROUPING OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS
DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATION
PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2.

93

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

17.

18.

19.

20.

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON EACH FIRM'S 60 DAY ESTIMATION PERIOD
R20F THE MARKET MODEL.

94

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR')
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET-MODEL R2
LESS THAN 0. 11.

96

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 40
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET-MODEL
R2 EQUAL TO OR EXCEEDING 0.11.

97

A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING IN 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT.

99

21.

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE
FIRMS.101

22.

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 45
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST FOLLOWING
NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).... 103

23.

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 29
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING
RANGING FROM 2 TO 16 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING GROUP).104

24. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE
FIRMS.106

25. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR),
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’)
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 30

xii

EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST FOLLOWING
NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).... 108
26.

AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), T-STATISTIC
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF AR POSITIVE ON DAY -1 RELATIVE TO THE
WSJI DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT DATE (DAY 0) FOR LOW
AND MEDIUM/HIGH INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT FIRMS IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST),
MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
HOLDING EQUITY (NINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2
(R2) AND NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) PROXIES.109

27.

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD
(T=-3,0) AVERAGE DAILY RETURN VARIANCES ACROSS INFORMATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET
CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY,
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING PROXIES.Ill

28.

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD
(T=-3,0) DAILY RETURN VARIANCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRM-EVENTS
ACROSS INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH
RESPECT TO THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET
MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING PROXIES.113

29.

RESULTS OF FIVE SEPARATE REGRESSIONS WITH THE TWO DAY
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.116

30.

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.117

31.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT
VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING
(LANLST) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.118

xiii

32. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.120
33. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT
VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’
EARNINGS FORECASTS (LDISP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.121
34.

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL
EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP),
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST),
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST), THE DISPERSION OF
ANALYSTS’EARNINGS FORECASTS (LDISP) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV)
AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.122

35.

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE
OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER
OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.124

36. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS
THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.126
37.

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE
OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER
OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.127

38.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS
THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.128

xiv

39.

A COMPARISON OF THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT WITH
THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AFTER THE
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT FOR 26 FIRMS.130

40.

A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST),
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 80 DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENTS.131

41.

A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(MKT. CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST),
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 63 DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENTS.132

42.

A CORRELATION MATRIX OF SIX PROXY VARIABLES,
NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM
EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2),
THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) AND THE DISPERSION OF
ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS (DISP) FOR 26 DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENTS.133

Al.

SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORY.150

A2.

SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND SIGNALLING THEORIES.152

A3.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND SIGNALLING.154

A4.

THE "DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION" LITERATURE.158

xv

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

The Dividend Puzzle:

An Overview

The impact of dividend policy on the value of the firm is an
unresolved issue in the academic literature.
Modigliani

In 1961,

Miller and

(MM) developed a comprehensive argument showing that dividends

are irrelevant in determining firm value.
investment decision of the firm,
shareholder wealth.

In short,

MM assert that,

given the

its dividend policy does not affect

1
under certain critical assumptions ,

MM

argue that the value of the firm is determined solely by the expected
cash flows provided by its investment policy.
However,

with the introduction of market imperfections,

payment of dividends may influence the value of the firm.
consider taxation effects.
to the issuing firm,
therefore,

market imperfections do not necessarily arise and,

personal taxes are considered,

dividends.

2

First,

Since dividend payments are not tax deductible

the irrelevance hypothesis remains operative.

value of the firm,

the

However,

when

the payment of dividends may influence the

if capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than

Farrar and Selwyn [1967] argue that,

firms should not pay dividends.

in such circumstances,

Any payments to shareholders should be

in the form of share repurchases which would be taxed at the lower
capital gains rate.
However,

Brennan [1970] concurs with this point of view.

Miller and Scholes [1978] temper the argument by showing that

dividend income may be sheltered with interest expense resulting in the

1

reduction or elimination of the dividend tax disadvantage.
according to Miller and Scholes,

Hence,

dividend irrelevance may hold even with

the differential tax treatment of income from dividends and capital
gains.

Empirical evidence,

may not be easily avoidable.

however,

indicates that taxes on dividends

For instance,

Feenberg [1981] examines tax

documents and finds that only about 2.5% of individuals can actually make
use of a tax-sheltering provision outlined by Miller and Scholes.
Peterson,

Peterson and Ang [1985] document that investors do pay

substantial taxes on dividends.
Other market imperfections are flotation and transaction costs.
Flotation costs favor the retention of earnings in the firm,
each dollar paid out in dividend,

current dividends.

for

the firm nets less than a dollar after

flotation costs per dollar of external financing.
associated with selling shares,

since,

however,

Transaction costs

tend to create a preference for

By nature these costs vary inversely with the size of

the sale and can amount to a rather significant percentage for a small
sale.

Hence,

stockholders with consumption desires in excess of current

dividends will prefer to receive the incremental income from additional
dividends rather than from capital gains.
In general,

an analysis of market imperfections does not explain

why firms pay dividends.

While,

MM’s "dividend irrelevance" proposition

appears to hold out when such imperfections are introduced in the form of
corporate taxes,

the presence of personal taxes and flotation costs

favors earnings retention.

To some extent,

transaction costs associated

with selling shares create a preference for current dividends.

However,

a strong case for paying dividends cannot be based on this factor alone.
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In their paper on dividend irrelevance,

MM recognize that stock

prices do respond to announced changes in dividends,
dramatically so.

and often,

They argue that this commonly observed strong positive

relationship between dividend announcements and stock price movements is
really caused by the information about future ("persistent") earnings
that management seeks to convey to the market through changes in dividend
policy.
While MM introduce the possibility of an information effect,
do not provide a formal theory to explain the phenomenon.

they

This is

because the assumption of complete information in their "dividend
irrelevance" proposition implies that the market knows the returns stream
of the firm and values this stream to determine the value of the firm.
The introduction of incomplete or asymmetric information suggests that
the market actually values a perceived stream of returns.

Hence,

the

initiation of a dividend payment or a change in the existing dividend
payout by the firm may alter the market’s perception about the firm’s
prospects,

which would,

in effect, alter the firm’s perceived risk class

even though the actual risk class may remain unchanged.

This proposition

underlies the "information content of dividends" hypothesis,

and marks

the beginning of the signalling literature on the subject.
Numerous academic studies have,
content of dividends" hypothesis.

3

since,

examined the "information

At the theoretical level,

the studies

generally have attached specific costs (such as adverse personal taxes,
modelled in Bhattacharya [1979] and John and Williams [1985],
investment opportunities foregone,
to the dividend,

and

represented in Miller and Rock [1985])

and examined the benefits to using dividend policy as a
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signalling mechanism.

At the empirical level,

confirm what MM hypothesized;

studies have attempted to

that markets do place a value on

announcements associated with dividend activity.
as generally defined in these studies,

"Information content",

is the extent of post-announcement

revision in market-agent beliefs concerning firm-value.
revision is usually unobservable,

Since belief

the empirical tradition has been to

infer a change in beliefs from an observed reaction in stock price.
Much of the empirical evidence seems to indicate that the
initiation of dividend payments or changes in the dividend payout do
convey some unanticipated information to the market.
studies by Asquith and Mullins [1983],

For instance,

Healy and Palepu [1988] and

Venkatesh [1989] document significant stock price reactions at the time
of dividend initiation announcements,

while Richardson,

Sefcik and

Thompson [1986] find evidence of a significant increase in trading volume
activity surrounding these events.
discussed in detail in Chapter 2,
dividend announcements.

A large number of empirical papers,
have found similar evidence for regular

Two notable exceptions are the studies by Watts

[1973] and Gonedes [1978].

Both authors document insignificant evidence

of "information content" in dividends.

However,

their findings have been

criticized on the grounds that these are based on monthly data which do
not allow explicit identification and control of contemporaneous
confounding events such as earnings announcements.
Although,

much of the empirical evidence is consistent with the

hypothesis that dividends convey information,

the effect of the firm’s

information environment on the information content of dividend
announcements has not been extensively examined.
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The firm’s information

environment

is defined in terms of the extent of information available in

the public domain at any given point of time.
observable,

the usual practice amongst researchers has been to employ

proxy variables.
[1988],

Since this is not directly

and Brown,

Recent studies by Mangiero [1988],

Eddy and Seifert

Choi and Kim [1989] have examined the informational

effects of regular dividend announcements in the context of asymmetrical
information environments.

All three studies have used market

capitalization (or size) to proxy for the firm’s information environment.
Further investigation into the nature and

role of the firm’s information

environment in determining the amount of information provided by dividend
announcements may provide additional insights into the information
signalling literature.
Asymmetrical information may have several implications for the
signalling impact of dividend changes.

Given semi-strong market

efficiency with costly information production and analyses,
traded,

a heavily

widely monitored firm will have more information publicly

available than a firm that is not widely followed.

A dividend signal

delivered by an obscure firm may impart more new information to the
market than a similar signal provided by a closely monitored firm.
Another argument in support of this premise is that the larger and more
established a company,

the greater is its access to capital markets

resulting in higher flexibility in its ability to pay cash dividends.
Therefore,

a dividend announcement effect is more likely to exist and

have a greater wealth impact for small or relatively obscure firms which
are forced to be more financially conservative than large or established
firms (Mangiero [1988]).
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1.2

The Study

The general purpose of this dissertation is to empirically examine the
information content of dividend initiation announcements in the context
of asymmetrical information environments.

A major objective of the study

is to search for systematic differences in the market’s response to
announcements of similar initial dividend payments by firms operating in
different information environments.
The study focusses on dividend initiations rather than subsequent
regular dividend announcements for two overall reasons.
initiations are,
therefore,

by definition,

rarely occur.

dividend

first time cash dividend payments and,

Hence,

be most visible at initiation,

First,

any hypothesized dividend effects should

on the premise that these announcements

are more likely to be unexpected than subsequent regular dividends
(Asquith and Mullins [1983]).

Second,

past studies on regular dividend

announcements have often found it difficult to adequately isolate and
control for investor expectations.

Mostly,

these studies have either

employed some dividend forecasting model to capture investors’
expectations (for instance Pettit [1972],
naive dividend expectations model

Watts [1973]) or have assumed a

(see Aharony and Swary [1980]).

We

have attempted to mitigate this problem since the dividend initiating
firms in our sample never paid dividends previously during their entire
corporate histories.
firms,

As observed by Asquith and Mullins [1983],

for such

the dividend forecasting models employed in other studies collapse

into the naive model.

Hence,

relative to subsequent regular dividend

6

changes,

the naive model should reflect investors’

expectations for

dividend initiations much better.
Consonant with earlier studies (for instance,
[1985],

Richardson [1984],

Atiase [1980]

Kross and Schroeder [1988]),

we define the

firm’s information environment in terms of the extent of information
available in the public domain at any given point of time.

We employ six

proxy variables to capture the firm’s information environment.
variables are market capitalization (or firm-size),
institutional equity holding,
equity,

percentage of

number of institutions holding the firm’s

the correlation between the firm’s earnings and macro-economy

wide earnings,

the number of analysts following the firm,

dispersion of analysts’

earnings forecasts.

first five proxy variables should reflect,

the dispersion of analysts’

and the

Our premise is that the
in varying degrees,

of publicly available information about the firm.
namely,

The

the amount

The sixth proxy -

earnings forecasts - should,

however,

capture qualitative differences across information environments since
this variable connotes the existence of heterogenous beliefs amongst
analysts.
The first part of the study attempts to test whether the
magnitude of security price reaction to a dividend initiation
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information
environment.

This issue is addressed,

however,

only after we have

ascertained the external validity of our data by examining whether the
dividend initiation announcements in our sample are associated with
abnormal share price movements.

By examining this issue,

we propose to

provide further direct evidence of the "dividend-signalling" hypothesis
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on the premise that the hypothesized effects
Chapter 3)

(outlined in detail

in

will occur only if investors impute a signalling value to the

dividend.
In this context,

it would be pertinent to analyze the

implications of alternate theories,
argument.

particularly the tax clientele

If tax clienteles are relevant,

then the initiation of

dividend payments should induce a change in clienteles - specifically
from high tax bracket

investors to low tax bracket

investors.

The

present value of any transaction costs associated with the expected
change in clienteles as well as the present value of any tax burden
imposed on the new clientele will appear in the market’s reaction
(Asquith and Mullins

[1983]).

Clientele shifts of this nature,

however,

would not explain why the market’s reaction to dividend initiation
announcements should systematically differ depending on the firm’s
information environment.
The second issue being addressed in this study is whether the
volatility of security price reaction to a dividend initiation
announcement
environment.

is systematically associated with the firm’s information
Kalay and Lowenstein [1985]

document substantial

increases

in the volatility of security returns for the days surrounding the
dividend announcement,
such periods.

largely due to high levels of uncertainty during

Moreover,

Patel1 and Wolfson [1979]

and Christie

[1983]

report that stock returns are more volatile around other regularly
scheduled announcements.

This increase in "event-period" returns

volatility should also be a function of the firm’s information
environment.

Hence,

the volatility increase is likely to be higher
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around dividend announcements by "low information" firms than around such
announcements by "high information" firms,

owing to relatively higher

levels of investor-uncertainty that may exist for "low information"
firms.
Finally,

the study seeks to statistically identify the

firm-specific characteristics) or proxy variable(s),
examined,

amongst those

which best explain(s) the magnitude of security price reaction

at the time of dividend initiation.

This would provide a clearer

understanding and identification of the variables which define the firm’s
information environment more effectively,

although it is recognized that

the set of six proxy variables used in this study may not fully explain
the firm’s information environment in its myriad,

albeit,

abstract

entirety.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
provides a detailed review of the literature.

Chapter 2

Chapter 3 conceptualizes

the research questions of the study and defines the hypotheses.

Chapter

4 provides details regarding the data and the information environment
proxy variables.
in Chapter 5.

The methodology for the statistical tests is discussed

Chapter 6 discusses the results of testing the hypotheses.

Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the findings,

reviews the

contributions of the study and suggests directions for future research.
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Chapter 1 Endnotes

1. The assumptions in MM’s [1961] "dividend irrelevance" model are:
i)
Perfect Capital Markets: This implies that
a) Transactions of individual buyers and sellers of securities do not.
have an appreciable impact on their ruling price.
b) All traders have equal and costless access to information.
c) There are no tax differentials either between distributed and
undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.
d) There are no transactions costs.
ii)
Rational Behavior: Investors always prefer more to less.
iii) Perfect Certainty:

Investors have full knowledge regarding the

future investments and profits of all firms.

2.

Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, capital gains are taxed at the same
rates as ordinary income.
However, this does not completely eliminate
the tax disadvantage of dividends since capital gains are still not
taxed until realized.

3.

A review of relevant theoretical and empirical work is provided in
Chapter 2.

10

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

2.1

The Dividend Policy Question

The foundation for a modern theory of dividend policy was
provided by the dividend irrelevance proposition of MM [1961].

The MM

model is a logical starting point not only for its historical
significance,
depicts.

but also for the pure and frictionless dividend market it

It serves as a convenient standard of comparison for later

models.
According to the MM argument,

given the stringent set of

assumptions discussed in Chapter 1 (Endnote 1),

the firm may utilize net

cash flows in either of two ways:

i) by investing in new projects to generate additional future cash flows,
or
ii) by paying dividends to shareholders.

Assuming homogenous beliefs and frictionless markets,

they argue

that the first form of utilization (new investment) need not be
curtailed as a result of the second (payment of dividends to
shareholders),

if the firm can costlessly issue new equity for each

dollar paid in dividends.

As a result,

the dollar amount and timing of

future cash flows remains unaltered despite the payment of dividends,
hence the value of the firm remains unchanged
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and

This assertion is shown to

hold on a per share basis as well where the ex-dividend price of each
share plus the amount of its dividend must equal the pre-dividend price.
The MM hypothesis of dividend irrelevance has not gone
unchallenged,

particularly when their strict assumptions are relaxed.

Farrar and Selwyn [1967] and Brennan [1970] examine investor choice,
given the differential personal tax rates between dividends and capital
gains.

Farrar and Selwyn [1967] use partial equilibrium analysis and

assume that individuals seek to maximize their after-tax income.

The

major implication of the model is that rational investors would prefer to
receive income from capital gains rather than from dividends as long as
the tax rate on capital gains is less than the personal tax rate.
firms should not pay dividends.

Hence,

Any payment to shareholders should be in

the form of share repurchase which will be treated as capital gains and
subjected to lower personal taxation.
Brennan [1970] extends the work of Farrar and Selwyn into a
general equilibrium framework,

where investors maximize the expected

utility of wealth by minimizing the tax burden.

In his model,

shareholders in lower marginal tax brackets will seek higher dividend
payouts from firms that are more highly leveraged,

while investors in

higher tax brackets will attempt to acquire wealth through capital gains
and simultaneously accumulate personal leverage.
that,

with risk held constant,

the market will demand a higher total

return on shares with higher dividend yields,
on dividend income.

Hence,

the Farrar and Selwyn model,

The author concludes

due to the higher tax rate

although Brennan’s model is more robust than
his overall conclusions are quite similar to

theirs.
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Miller and Scholes [1978],

however,

show that dividend

irrelevance holds even in a world with personal tax rates.

They argue

that the high-income investor can borrow to acquire high-dividend shares
and offset the tax differential by deducting the interest paid on the
loan.

Hence many shareholders need not pay more than the capital gains

rate on dividend income.
Several studies,

however,

provide empirical evidence indicating

that taxes on dividends may not be easily avoidable.

For instance,

Feenberg [1981] examines tax documents and finds that only about 2.5% of
individuals can actually utilize the tax-sheltering provisions outlined
by Miller and Scholes.

Peterson,

Peterson and Ang [1985] have documented

that investors pay substantial amounts in taxes on dividends.
example,

For

in 1979 over $10 billion was paid in taxes on dividends

totalling $34 billion.
Implicit in MM’s assumption of full information is that there are
no agency costs since actions of agents such as managers are fully
observable.

The introduction of asymmetric information may generate

incentives for wealth redistributing agency behavior among different
claimants of the firm.

There are at least two principal-agent

relationships in which dividend policy plays a role.

The first is the

potential bondholder (principal) versus the shareholder (as agent of the
bondholders’

funds) conflict,

feature of corporations.

which arises due to the limited liability

Limited liability allows shareholders

potentially very large gains but limited losses.
take more risk at the expense of bondholders.

This encourages them to

Moreover,

payment of

dividends to shareholders bypasses the priority structure of claims,
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as

shareholders are able to receive the firm’s cash flows before the
bondholders’

claims are satisfied.

In the extreme,

liquidation of the

firm to pay shareholders dividends will leave bondholders holding the
empty corporate shell.

Therefore,

smaller dividend payout is better,

from the bondholders’

viewpoint,

a

and the need to constrain dividend

payment as part of bond covenants is recognized (John and Kalay [1982]).
The second agency problem is between outside shareholders versus
the management (the agent).

Dividend payments have actually been

proposed as partial solutions to agency problems of this nature,

on the

premise that firms which pay dividends may be forced to obtain funds in
the primary market more frequently,

and will,

therefore be more closely

monitored by intermediaries such as investment bankers (see Rozeff
[1982],

Easterbrook [1984]).

Rozeff suggests that there could be a

trade-off between the flotation costs of raising external capital and the
benefits of such reduced agency costs when the firm increases its
dividend payout.
argument.

Two considerations limit the usefulness of this

Firstly,

underinvest,

firms could in fact pay more dividends and

thereby avoiding the extra scrutiny.

Secondly,

outsiders do

not necessarily monitor corporate management’s performance between
periods of external financing any better than analysts who continually
monitor the firm (Miller and Rock [1985]).
While various theories have been offered to explain the observed
dividend-paying behavior of firms,
examine

the purpose of this study is to

"dividend-signalling theory",

which also stems from the work of

i

MM [1961].

The following sub-section conducts a review of the

theoretical work in this area.
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2.2

Dividend-Signalling Theory
The MM model of dividend irrelevance assumed "full information",

and hence could not explain how dividends might possess new information.
Several papers

2

have,

since,

sought to relax this assumption and examine

the role of dividends as signalling mechanisms.

A common underlying

premise in these studies is that for dividends to have "informational
content",
(i)

3
the following conditions should hold :

Managers possess more information about the firm’s future prospects
than outside investors.

(ii)

Managers have incentives to make this information known.
since much of it may be confidential in nature,

However,

a direct release of

such information may jeopardize future prospects or give
competitors an advantage.

Therefore,

the information must be

conveyed indirectly through signals.
(iii) The dividend change,
credible.

as a signal of new information,

In order to penalize false signallers,

has to be

the false

dividend signal should entail a cost.
(iv)

Since a number of financial decisions can be interpreted as
signals,

the dividend should be amongst the least costly signals.

Otherwise,

based on marginal analysis,

managers would prefer to use

a lower-cost signal.
Ross [1977] postulates a "one-period" model wherein managers seek
to resolve existing information asymmetries between themselves and the
shareholders by signalling the firm’s ability to support risky debt in
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its capital structure.

In the model,

managerial compensation is

positively linked to firm-value - this feature is the cost of "false
signalling".

While Ross’s argument pertains to capital structure,

states that his hypothesis applies to dividend policy as well
p.39).

Moreover,

dividend policy,

he

(1977,

Kalay [1980] has shown that the Ross model holds for
and need not be confined to arguments regarding capital

structure.
In his "one-period" model,

Ross distinguishes between two "types"

of firms which begin with equal market values at time = 0.
period.

After one

Type "A" firms will have a total return (hence ending value)

equal to "a",

and Type "B" firms will accrue value equal to "b",

the quantity "a" is greater than "b".

where

The initial equality in the market

values of the firms arises because at the beginning of the period
investors are still unaware of management’s expectations regarding future
returns for the two otherwise identical firms.
This asymmetry of information is resolved when managers signal
their expectations regarding future cash flows through dividend payments.
The cash flows generated from returns "a" are sufficient to support
dividend payments,

and still allow the firm to finance its debt service

and all other financial obligations.

Returns "b",

however,

are not

sufficient to allow the payment of dividends without increasing the
probability of bankruptcy.
In Ross’s one-period "incentive signalling" model,

management

compensation is positively linked to the value of the firm,
incurring the maximum penalty if the firm enters bankruptcy.
feature is the "signalling" cost.

Therefore,
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with managers
This

there is a wealth incentive

for managers to issue the correct signal regarding firm type when
establishing the firm’s dividend policy.

Managers of "A" firms will

increase their personal compensation by issuing the proper positive
dividend signal,

while managers of "B" firms will maximize their personal

wealth by not mimicking their "A" counterparts and sending false signals.
Kalay [1980],

adapts the Ross argument to dividend payments.

He

argues that investors will view any increase in dividend payments as a
"correct" signal and attribute a higher value to it,
knowledge of the management compensation scheme.

given their

Similarly,

any future

reduction in dividend payments will cause a decline in the value of
shares,

thus adding to the incentive for managers to signal correctly.
A major implication of the Ross model is that once dividends are

initiated,
are,

shareholders anticipate a periodic signal by management who

therefore,

other words,

in effect forced to submit to a periodic review.

In

management is thought to increase the dividend only when it

is confident that the new dividend can be maintained over time.
of empirical papers have substantiated this conclusion.

A number

Lintner [1956],

Fama and Babiak [1968] and Aharony and Swary [1980] have provided
evidence to show that firms change regular dividends relatively
infrequently - in only 23% to 25% of the sampled quarters.
Bhattacharya [1979] develops a model closely related to that of
Ross.

His objective is to explain why firms pay dividends despite the

personal tax disadvantage.

In his model dividends convey information

about the value of the firm which cannot be fully communicated by other
means such as annual reports or earnings forecasts.

Hence,

dividend increase will be taken as a favourable signal.
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an unexpected

It is expensive

for less successful firms to mimic the signal because they must incur
extra costs associated with raising external funds in order to pay the
cash dividend.

Hence,

the signalling value of dividends is positive and

can be traded off against the tax disadvantage associated with the
dividend income to achieve an optimal payout.

This suggests the

possibility of an optimal dividend policy.
Hakansson [1982] recasts the dividend irrelevance propositions in
the taxless case (MM [1961]) and the tax-neutrality case (Miller and
Scholes [1978])

into a general equilibrium framework,

wherein the

potential of dividends to provide information is explicitly recognized.
He demonstrates that dividends serve no useful role when investors have
homogenous beliefs regarding the dividend payout,
are fully efficient.

In fact,

overall welfare (efficiency).

with positive costs,
On the other hand,

welfare when they are informative,
beliefs,

and financial markets
dividends reduce

dividends can improve

provided investors have heterogenous

financial markets are incomplete,

and investors have differing

attitudes about how they wish to allocate consumption expenditures over
time.

Hence,

according to the Hakansson model,

useful "signalling" role,

for dividends to play a

they should not only be informative,

but the

above three conditions should also be satisfied.
The Miller and Rock [1985] model assumes asymmetric information
between managers and outside investors about the state of the firm’s
current earnings.

This assumption is shown to negate the Fisherian

criterion for optimal investment by the firm -i.e.

invest in real assets

until the marginal internal rate of return equals the risk-adjusted rate
of return on securities.

Within this asymmetric information framework,
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knowing that the market takes announced dividends as a clue to unobserved
earnings,

managers are tempted to increase "unexpected" dividends in

order to run up stock prices,
investment.

at the expense of cutting back on

The presumption is that,

learn the truth,

although the market will eventually

the immediate short run benefits to seller-shareholders

and managers (whose compensations are tied to the firm’s short-run price
performance) will exceed the loss to shareholders who do not sell.
a rational expectations framework,

Using

the model derives a signalling

equilibrium in which the optimum investment level is shown to be below
the first-best optimum investment of the MM [1961] full-information
model.

Hence,

while the benefit from signalling positively through

dividends is the resultant increase in firm value,

the cost in this model

is underinvestment and not (as in the Bhattacharya model)

increased taxes

to shareholders.
John and Williams [1985],
personal tax costs to dividends.

like Bhattacharya,

impute adverse

In their signalling equilibrium model,

insiders in firms with valuable future cash inflows distribute dividends
and receive enhanced prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash
by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal
supply of cash.

Among all firms which signal,

those with more favourable

inside information optimally pay larger dividends and realize higher
prices for their stock.
In Ambarish,

John and Williams [1987] an efficient signalling

equilibrium with dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed.
Because corporate insiders have the choice to exploit multiple signals,
the efficient mix must minimize their costs.
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The authors distinguish

between two categories of firms - those with valuable assets in place but
limited investment opportunities (usually,

large mature firms) and those

with few assets in place but valuable opportunities to invest (the small,
rapidly growing firms).

For the former firms,

inside information should

emanate mainly from existing assets while for the latter private
information should arise primarily from current opportunities.
Miller and Rock,

the authors show that in equilibrium,

Like

firms may both

distribute dividends and also deviate from first-best investment
situations.

Moreover,

shown to be positive,

while the impact of dividends on stock prices is
the announcement effect of new stock is negative

for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and
positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to
invest.

A major implication of this paper is that since the tax on

dividends is not insignificant,
economical signal.

the dividend in itself may not be an

By combining the dividend signal with other signals

such as debt or investment changes,

the firm may be able to obtain a

less-costly signalling-mix.
The immediate theoretical inference that emerges from the
"dividend signalling" models,

therefore,

is that the announcement of a

dividend (or a change in dividend) conveys information about management’s
assessment of firm-specific prospects,

that this information is

different from other information provided by management,
cause an immediate investor reaction.
convincing,

unambiguous signals,

and,

hence,

may

For dividend announcements to be

they must be costly at the margin.

All

the models discussed above have attached specific costs (either adverse
personal taxes or investment opportunities foregone) to the dividend.
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Moreover,

these models have shown that because of such costs,

the

announcement effects of dividends must be positive.
The dividend signalling models have been criticized on at least
two counts.

4

Firstly,

"signalling cost"

dividend signalling with personal tax as a

(as in Bhattacharya [1979] and John and Williams

[1985]) suffers from an assignment problem.

For,

whereas the cost of

false signalling should justly be borne by the insiders (managers),
signalling cost in the form of adverse taxes falls mostly on the outside
shareholders.

According to Ang [1987] this difficulty may be alleviated

by extending the dividend signalling argument to a multiperiod framework
where longer term variables such as the future compensation of managers,
the value of their reputation,
financing,

and the increased cost of future

may serve as alternate means to bond the manager,

signals more credibility.

giving the

A possible second criticism of dividend¬

signalling equilibrium models is that they have a "self-fulfilling"
quality.

In a world of rational expectations,

managers and outside

investors display predictable game-like behavior.

For instance,

managers

do not reduce dividends because they feel that investors would react
unfavourably,

while investors react negatively to a dividend cut because

they believe that managers would be reluctant to cut dividends.

However,

some evidence of this "self-fulfilling" behavior has been provided by
Kalay and Lowenstein [1986] who have documented that whenever management
faces an unfavourable prospect,
announcement;

investors,

they tend to delay the dividend

aware of such management behavior,

negatively to the delay.
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react

A plethora of empirical papers have sought to empirically examine
"dividend signalling" theory.

A review of this empirical literature on

the "information content of dividends" follows in the next sub-section.

2.3

Empirical Evidence of Dividend Signalling

The first major empirical study on the "information content of
dividends" hypothesis is the paper by Fama,
(FFJR)

Fisher,

Jensen and Roll

[1969] which actually pertains to stock splits.

The authors find

that all stock split announcements are subject to substantial abnormal
returns.

However,

further analysis reveals that for firms which increase

dividends subsequent to the split,
remain positive,

cumulative abnormal residuals (CAR)

whereas for firms which subsequently decrease the

dividend or maintain it at the same level the CAR’s decline rapidly and
perform poorly thereafter.
announcement,
increases,

The authors conclude that the stock split

in its role as a precursor of future cash dividend

conveys useful information to the market.

However,

the

information relates to an anticipation of future cash dividend increases
which are assumed to convey important information to the market.
In separate tests of market efficiency,

Pettit [1972] and

Charest [1978] use announced changes in dividend policy to measure how
quickly the market adjusts to new information.

Both find that the market

tends to adjust immediately to dividend increase announcements.
in Charest’s study,

However,

the adjustment process is slow for dividend decreases

as the negative return effects continue beyond the quarter in which the
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dividend decrease is announced.

Hence,

while both studies find evidence

of "information content" in dividend announcements,

Charest’s results

are not very robust with regard to market efficiency.
Two early papers which do not find significant evidence of
"information content" in dividends are by Watts [1973] and Gonedes
[1978].

Using a model which regresses dividend payments on one-year

lagged earnings,

Watts offers two possible explanations for his

contradictory results.

First,

he raises the possibility that the true

expectation of future earnings may have been obscured by the lagged
earnings variable in his model.

Alternatively,

he suggests that

management may not be imparting any proprietory information through
dividend policy.

In a similar vein,

Gonedes [1978] finds that current

and past dividends do not improve the accuracy of forecasts of future
earnings relative to forecasts based on only current and past earnings.
Hence,

the theoretical prediction that the information contained in

dividend announcements relates to future cash flows or earnings is not
supported by his study.
A major shortcoming in both the Watts [1973] and Gonedes [1978]
studies is that they employed monthly data.

This did not allow them to

explicitly identify and control for contemporaneous information such as
earnings announcements.

To avoid this problem,

a study by Aharony and

Swary [1980] uses daily data and controls for possible earnings
announcement effects by examining dividend announcements which were made
at different dates than earnings announcements.

The study concludes from

its findings that announcements of "changes in quarterly dividends
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provide useful information beyond that provided by corresponding
quarterly earnings numbers"

(1980,

p.11).

In contrast to the previous studies,

Asquith and Mullins [1983]

test for the "information content of dividends" by examining cash
dividend initiations.

They assume that these events are more likely to

be unexpected than subsequent regular dividend announcements for which
the market would already have discounted an expectation of future cash
flows based on the firm’s past dividend history.

On the other hand,

if

investors possess little past information upon which to value the shares,
then the initiation of dividend payments should convey significant new
information regarding management’s expectations of future cash flows and
the firm’s ability to support future payments.
hypothesis,

Consistent with their

Asquith and Mullins find the average two-day excess return on

firms initiating cash dividends to be much higher than for the largest
absolute subsequent increase in dividends.
initiations "convey unique,

They conclude that dividend

valuable information to investors"

(1983,

p.94).
Several studies on dividends have,
initiation data.

Richardson,

since,

examined dividend

Sefcik and Thompson [1986] use the dual

event periods of 1) the dividend initiation announcement and 2) the
interval from announcement to ex-dividend date in order to investigate
the implications of clientele theories that changes in dividend policy
should result in a marked increase in trading volume as shareholder
clienteles change.

They conclude that volume increases primarily in

response to the signal about future earnings contained in the dividend.
Clientele adjustments are found to be small.

24

Following Lintner [1956],

several studies have observed that

managers are reluctant to reduce or omit dividend payments (eg;
[1969],

Pettit [1972]).

FFJR

This point is further addressed by Kalay [1980].

Using Ross’s [1977] model,

Kalay hypothesizes that dividend reductions

which are forced on firms with restrictive debt covenants,

cannot convey

new information concerning the expectation of future cash flows.
sample of 197 dividend reductions,
from debt contract constraints and,

From a

he identifies only 10 as resulting
therefore,

concludes that most

dividend cuts are not forced through contractual arrangements.

Hence,

he

is unable to reject the hypothesis that dividend reductions signal
management’s need or intention to conserve liquid funds in the firm.
This issue of whether dividend reductions are often necessitated
by the firm’s need to conserve cash for future investment in the face of
projected cash shortages is examined by Woolridge and Ghosh [1987].

They

argue that if a firm has plenty of profitable investment opportunities
available,

but little available cash,

financing is substantial,

and if its cost of external

then the value of its shares may be increased

by reducing current dividends and increasing investments.
of this hypothesis,

In their test

they find that while the market perceives all

dividend cuts as negative signals,

the stocks of firms which reduce

dividend payments for the purpose of increasing investment generally
recover all lost returns in the ensuing two years.

The authors contend

that the initial negative market reaction for firms with stated growth
prospects occurs because of the moral hazards confronting managers.
other words,

shareholders may not believe the explanations management

offers to justify the reduced dividend payout.
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In

A similar issue has been addressed by Divecha and Morse [1983].
Their study groups firms increasing their dividends into two samples one comprising of firms that also increased their payout ratios and the
other of firms that decreased their payout ratios.

Their results show

that the group of firms decreasing their payout ratios at the time
dividends were increased recorded higher abnormal returns than the firms
increasing their payout ratios.

The authors attribute the market’s

interpretation of the reduced payout ratio as a sign of access to
profitable growth opportunities.

A potential problem with their

conclusion is that the dividend payout ratio falls as earnings increase;
and the superior market performance of lower payout firms could be
attributed to the higher earnings which caused the payout ratio to fall.
This finding of Divecha and Morse [1983]
Kane,

is partially substantiated by

Lee and Marcus [1984] who show that investors give more credence to

unanticipated dividend increases or decreases when earnings are also
above or below expectations.
An alternative explanation for stock price behaviour around
dividend announcements is the "wealth redistribution hypothesis"
motivated by agency theory.

5
As noted by several researchers ,

unexpected

dividend increases would redistribute wealth from the bondholders to the
stockholders if such increases are financed by issuing new debt (of equal
or higher seniority than the existing debt) or by reducing investment
outlays.

Thus,

the positive (negative) impact of dividend increases

(reductions) on stockholders’

wealth can be atleast partly explained by

bondholders’

However,

losses (gains).

and Handjinicolaou and Kalay [1984]

the findings of Woolridge [1983]

indicates that the signalling effect
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appears to dominate since there is no clear evidence that dividend
increases may be used as a method to expropriate wealth from bondholders.
In spite of the empirical evidence,

none of the papers cited

above fully substantiated a major premise of the "information content of
dividends hypothesis";

viz,

share prices respond to dividend changes

because dividend changes are forecasts of future earnings.
of several later papers (namely,
[1988],

Venkatesh [1989],

Ofer and Siegel

and Brown,

[1987],

The results

Healy and Pelepu

Choi and Kim [1989]),

have

substantiated this premise.
Ofer and Siegel

[1987] present evidence that security analysts

revise their earnings forecasts following unexpected dividend changes and
that the magnitude of the revision is related to the dividend change.
Two recent papers (Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989])
examine the relationship between dividend initiations and future
earnings.

Healy and Palepu [1988] document that dividend-initiating

firms experience earnings growth in the year of the dividend announcement
and for two subsequent years,
[1988] primarily focus on

but not thereafter.

While Healy and Palepu

the initial dividend announcement,

Venkatesh

[1989] hypothesizes that investors learn from the initial dividend as
well as from subsequent dividends.

He finds that the information content

of earnings announcements is substantially lower after the introduction
of quarterly cash dividends, regardless of whether the earnings
announcements precede or follow the associated dividend announcements.
Venkatesh also finds that the the volatility of daily returns is
lower in the post dividend period,
"firm-specific"

primarily due to a decrease in the

(non market) component of volatility.
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He explains this

phenomenon by suggesting that,

in the post dividend period,

accord less importance to pieces of "information"

investors

(announcements,

rumors)

that could have induced larger price reactions in the pre dividend
period.

This evidence reinforces the notion that investors view

dividends as an information transmission mechanism.
Recently,

McCann [1987] has suggested that the firm’s dividend

decision is essentially an investment decision.

He argues that the

initiation of dividend allows the firm a broader access to capital
markets and lowers the cost of capital.

This increases the firm’s level

of investment as more projects now have a positive net present value.
Consistent with these observations,
initiation of dividend,

McCann finds that,

following the

the systematic and unsystematic risk of common

stock returns declines whereas the firm’s investment activity increases.
However,

McCann also finds evidence of a significant decrease in the

growth in the cash flow per share.

Overall,

McCann’s findings suggest

that the dividend initiation is signalling not higher earnings but less
risk.
Several recent studies have focussed on the informational effects
of regular dividend announcements in the context of the firm’s
informational environment.
Brown,

Mangiero [1988],

Eddy and Seifert [1988],

Choi and Kim [1989] have shown that the information content of

regular dividend announcements is negatively related to firm size.
Brown,

Choi and Kim [1989] examine the extent to which firm size,

and

signal preemption influence the information content of dividends and
earnings.

They show that (i) the information content of dividends and

earnings is negatively related to firm size (ii) dividends are more
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and

preemptive of earnings than vice versa,

suggesting that dividends are the

more informative signal regarding firms’

future cash flows.

The findings of Bajaj and Vijh [1990],
anomalous.

however,

are somewhat

The authors examine the market’s response to all dividend

announcements,

without any ex-post selection criterion,

and document

statistically significant positive excess returns around the dividend

g
announcement dates.
small-firm,

However,

the positive excess returns are higher for

low-priced and high-yield stocks.

The authors conclude that

"these effects cannot be interpreted as pricing for missing factors from
am particular formulation of the CAPM"

2.4

Differential

[1990,

p.22].

Information

The firm’s information environment has been the subject of
extensive theoretical and empirical investigation.
researchers,

A number of

including Verrechia [1979] and Atiase [1980],

have analyzed

various firm-specific factors which provide incentives for private
information acquisition.

The major conclusions that have emerged from

such studies are that
a) the scale of operation (i.e the amount of potential information in a
particular firm) must be sufficiently large to justify the cost of
information acquisition
and
b) there must be sufficient demand and supply for a stock such that its
price is not easily affected by an individual trader’s activities,
thereby revealing his private information at the time of trade.
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Verrechia [1979] has shown that the amount of privately acquired
information impounded in the stock price through trading increases with
increased market participation.
increases with firm size,
predisclosure (i.e.

Observing that market participation

Atiase [1980] hypothesizes that the amount of

non-accounting)

information production and

dissemination is an increasing function of the capitalized value of the
firm.

This hypothesis is further strengthened by Richardson [1984] who

suggests that because institutions do not have holdings in low market
capitalization firms due to liquidity problems,

analysts in turn have

less incentive to follow smaller firms due to lower expected commission
revenues from institutional transactions.
Damodaran [1985],

suggests that the return generating process of

information deficient firms may more closely resemble a mixed
jump-diffusion process rather than the typical continuous distribution
assumed by the use of standard event study procedures,
of information arrival for such firms is discrete.
with numerous information sources,

since the nature

However,

for firms

information arrival is likely to

consist of the frequent arrival of smaller amounts of new information on
average.

Hence,

the stock prices of information deficient firms will be

adjusted less frequently relative to the stock prices of closely followed
firms,

to reflect the new information.

Damodaran’s [1985] paper may be

interpreted to suggest that the marginal information contained in any
firm-specific announcement will decline as the firm’s prior information
sources increase.
From a different standpoint,

Barry and Brown [1985] formulate a

model of equilibrium asset pricing under differential information,

30

wherein the securities of firms with less information availability are
shown to have greater perceived risk.

Investors demand higher returns

from such low information securities due to greater uncertainty.

Hence,

although these securities may appear to earn positive abnormal returns,
in fact,

the "excess" returns would only be commensurate with higher

risk.
A number of empirical studies have reported results consistent
with the above predictions.

Atiase [1985] finds a much greater price

adjustment to the quarterly earnings announcements of small firms than
that of large firms.

Freeman [1987] reports similar findings,

although

he observes that the security prices of large firms anticipate accounting
earnings earlier than the security prices of small firms.
Studies by Grant [1980] and Kross and Schroeder [1988] attempt to
corroborate these findings for annual earnings announcements.

Grant

[1980] suggests that there is a greater flow of prior non-accounting
information for large firms versus small firms between releases of
accounting reports.

Using exchange-listing status and number of prior

news articles as surrogates for prior information availability,

he finds

a significantly greater number of interim news items appearing in the
Wall Street Journal for NYSE firms relative to OTC firms.

Kross and

Schroeder [1988] hypothesize that earnings announcements convey more
information on obscure firms than on prominant firms.

They define

"prominance" as the amount of coverage in the Wall Street Journal for a
specific firm.

Their findings "lend strong support to the proposition

that earnings announcements convey more information on obscure firms than
on prominant firms"

(1988,p.72).
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As discussed in Section 2.3,
Seifert [1988].

and Brown,

recently,

Mangiero [1988],

Eddy and

Choi and Kim [1989] have shown that the

information content of regular dividend announcements is negatively
related to firm size.

7

Richardson [1984] selects multiple measures of market
participation and shows that smaller firms,

on average,

have

characteristics that are suggestive of lower market participation;
namely,

fewer shareholders,

coverage,

less dispersion in ownership,

less following by analysts,

and less share turnover.

less press

less shares held by institutions,

Richardson’s study suggests that different

measures of the firm’s information environment are likely to be highly
correlated with firm-size.
McNichols and Manegold [1983] use the presence or absence of
quarterly accounting reports as a surrogate for the extent of prior
information availability.
is,

on average,

They show that the report-week price reaction

greater for firms with no quarterly reports than for

firms with quarterly reports.

This conclusion is consistent with

Ohlson’s [1979] theoretical result which demonstrates that the price
reaction to earnings decreases when interim earnings are introduced.
Arbel and Strebel

[1982,1983] provide empirical evidence

suggesting that firms with low levels of analyst following (measured by
the number of analysts forecasting a firm’s earnings) earn higher
risk-adjusted returns.

Moreover,for companies of similar size,

the

neglected firms significantly outperform the highly followed ones (Arbel
and Strebel

[1983])

small firm effect.

Hence,

analysts following appears to dominate the

Bhushan [1989] analyses the major determinants of the
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number of analysts following a firm,

and finds this variable to be

positively related to the percentage of institutional holding in the
firm’s ownership structure,

as well as to firm size and the correlation

between the firm’s returns and the market return,

but negatively related

to the number of lines of business of the firm.
Divergence of analyst opinion is another potential surrogate for
the amount of relevant

information available.

Financial Aanlysts Forecasts
Barry and Brown [1984]

g
(FAF) might proxy for market expectations ,

suggest that divergence of analyst opinion be used

as a proxy for ex-ante earnings uncertainty.
[1985]

Using the premise that

Moreover,

Barry and Brown

develop a theoretical model to show that the divergence of opinion

is a decreasing function of the quality of information available.
Callahan,

Elgers and Strock [1987]

dispersion of analysts’
information environment.

have used the cross-sectional

earnings forecasts as one proxy for the firm’s
However,

they have cautioned that the

usefulness of this measure may be affected by outdated forecasts because
analysts are not required to revise or confirm their forecasts at each
report week.

In a recent study,

Ajinkya,

Atiase and Gift

[1991]

report

evidence of a significant positive association between the dispersion in
analysts’

forecasts of annual earnings per share and the volume of

trading.

The authors conclude that the degree of heterogeneity in

beliefs,

measured by the dispersion of analysts’

determinant of the intensity of trading.

Morse,

earnings forecasts,
Stephan and St ice

is a

[1991]

examine the effect of an annual earnings announcement on the dispersion
of analysts’one-year-ahead forecasts.

Interestingly,

the authors find

that forecasts become more dispersed than would be expected in the
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absence of an earnings announcement.

Using the premise that an

explanation for their empirical results is the nonsynchronous updating of
forecasts by analysts,

the authors partition their sample on the length

of time between the announcement date and the next IBES (Institutional
Brokers Estimate System) report into short-lag and long-lag groups and
find a much higher number of forecast revisions for the latter group than
for the former.

The authors conclude that partitioning of their sample

in this manner provides a more accurate measure of changes in the
dispersion of forecasts due to an earnings announcement.
Richardson [1984] hypothesizes that as the correlation between
firm cash flows and the overall state of the economy (measured,
the gross national product)

increases,

say,

by

macro information increasingly

tends to preempt the information contained in a firm-spocific signal.
Using the R

2

of the market model as a surrogate of the extent of prior

information available due to macro information sources,

Richardson shows

that the price reaction to earnings varies inversely with the
2

market-model R .

2.5 Conclusion
From our earlier review of the relevant literature,

researchers

appear to be in general agreement that an important variable in the
firm’s dividend decision is the informational or signalling value of an
unexpected dividend change.

Moreover,

the Differential Information

literature suggests that the informational value of a firm-specific
signal would essentially be a function of the firm’s information
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environment.

A summary of the studies reviewed in this Chapter appears

in Appendix A (pages 149 to 160).
We now turn to formalizing the research questions pertaining to
the major objective of this study - namely,

an examination of the

informational content of dividend initiation announcements in the context
of the firm’s information environment.

35

Chapter 2 Endnotes

1.

Actually, formal signalling theory appears to have been first
formulated by Michael Spence [1973] in the context of the labour
market.
The potential for signalling arises whenever the sellers of a
commodity know more about its quality than the buyers.
Hence, those
with superior products have an incentive to convincingly "signal" their
high quality to the market in order to command a higher price.
In the
absence of such signals, unable to distinguish quality differences,
buyers offer a price that reflects only their perception of average
quality.

2.

Such as Bhattacharya [1979], Hakansson [1982], Miller and Rock [1985],
John sind Williams [1985], Ambarish, John and Williams [1987].

3.

See Ang [1987] for a full discussion.

4.

See Ang [1987].

5.

See, for instance Blank [1976], Jensen and Meckling [1976],
[1977].

6.

Earlier papers by Eades, Hess and Kim [1985] and Kalay and Lowenstein
[1985] have provided similar evidence.

7.

However, Bajaj and Vijh [1990], examine the market’s response to all
regular dividend announcements without any ex-post selection and
document significantly higher positive excess returns for small firms.
The authors view their findings as anomalous in the light of existing
theories of asset pricing.

8.

The notion that FAF might proxy for market expectations gains support
from the study of Elton, Gruber and Gultekin [1981] which shows that
FAF have a substantial influence on stock prices.
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and Myers

CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

3.1

Informational Effects of Dividend Initiations

A number of studies have documented evidence indicating that
dividend initiation announcements convey significant new information to
the market.

For instance,

the seminal work by Asquith and Mullins [1983]

finds the average two-day excess return on firms initiating cash
dividends to be much higher than for the largest subsequent increase in
cash dividends by the sampled firms.

The results reported in more recent

papers by Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989] have corroborated
these findings of information content in dividend initiations.
The first step in the formulation of this study,

therefore,

is to

ascertain whether the experience of the sample firms is similar overall
to that of previous work on dividend initiations.

This is done by

examining whether the sample of dividend initiation announcements being
examined conveys unexpected information to the market on average.
this purpose,

For

the following research question is addressed

Are dividend initiation announcements associated with significant
positive abnormal share price reactions?

The price reaction is defined as the magnitude of the Mean Standardized
Abnormal Returns (MSAR) over the two day "event-period" comprising of the
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day the news regarding the dividend initiation announcement is published
in the Wall Street Journal
often,

(denoted by t=0) and the previous day,

since,

news is transmitted over the Broad Tape on this day (Asquith and

Mullins [1983]).

This suggests

Hypothesis 1
Dividend Initiation announcements are associated with significant
positive MSAR.

3.2

Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment: Price
Effects
The second issue being addressed in the study is whether the

magnitude of security price reaction to a dividend initiation
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information
environment.

Is there

More specifically,

an

inverse

our research question is

association

of security price reaction to a

between

dividend

the

magnitude

initiation

announcement and the firm’s information environment?

This research question is addressed by examining the relative
information content of a given dividend initiation across different
firm-specific information environments.

The premise is that the

information content per unit of a given dividend initiation should be
more for a "low information environment" firm relative to a "high
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information environment" firm,

which in turn should generate relatively

higher price reactions for the "low information environment" firms.

The

firm’s information environment is defined in terms of the extent of
firm-specific information available in the public domain immediately
prior to the dividend initiation announcement.
In the process of examining the research issues pertaining to
the role of the firm’s information environment in determining the
magnitude of stock price reactions to dividend initiations,
focuses on the size of the dividend yield,
deflated by the price of the stock,
the initiation.

the study

given by the dividend amount,

rather than the absolute magnitude of

Standardizing the dividend in this manner becomes

necessary in the light of documented evidence that, often,

firm-specific

characteristics are associated with the price of the firm’s stock.
instance,

For

Kross [1985] has shown that "low" market capitalization firms

also tend to have lower priced stocks.

Hence,

the premise of the study

is that the size of dividend yield may be a more appropriate measure than
the absolute magnitude of the dividend initiation.
Our second research question yields the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 2
The lower the firm’s information environment,

the higher will be

the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement.

Since,
observed,

the firm’s information environment cannot be directly

the practice among empirical studies in this area has been to

define and use proxy variables.

One variable which has been extensively
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applied is market capitalization,

on the premise

that the amount of

prior information available about a firm’s activities as well as the
number of informed and participating traders are an increasing function
of the capitalized value of the firm.

Recent studies which have

investigated the informational effects of regular dividend announcements
in the context of asymmetrical information environments have all used
market capitalization to proxy for the firm’s information environment.

2

Their findings suggest that the information content of regular dividend
announcements is negatively related to firm size.
in Bajaj and Vijh [1990],
findings.

however,

The evidence presented

sheds a controversial light on these

Bajaj and Vijh examine the market’s response to all regular

dividend announcements without any ex-post selection and document
significantly higher positive excess returns for small firms.

The

authors view their findings as anomalous in the light of existing
theories of asset pricing.

Our study contends that Bajaj and Vijh’s

findings should not apply to dividend initiations which,
subsequent dividend announcements,
We,

therefore,

unlike

are not regular predictable events.

posit that

Hypothesis 2A
The lower the firm’s market capitalization,

the higher will be

the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement.
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Large institutions usually tend to exclude equity holdings in low
market capitalization firms from their investment portfolios.
reason,

as suggested by Richardson [1984],

The

is that by imposing a cut-off

on equity investments based on market capitalization,

institutions shield

against liquidity problems that may arise by taking a large position in
the stock of a small firm.

This reasoning suggests that the percentage

of institutional holding in a firm’s equity as well as the number of
institutions holding the firm’s equity may both be viable measures of its
information environment.

Hence,

the following hypotheses pertain to

these proxy variables

Hypothesis 2B
The lower the percentage of institutional holding in the firm’s
equity,

the higher will be the MSAR associated with a given

initial dividend announcement.

Hypothesis 2C
The lower the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity
the higher will be the MSAR associated with a given initial
dividend announcement.

The extent of institutional holding in the firm has a direct
bearing on its level of analyst following,
stocks that are held by institutions.

since analysts tend to follow

Richardson [1984] observes that

large institutions are major customers of private information produced by
analysts in brokerage firms.

If convexities exist in the cost functions
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of analysts,

they might choose not to follow firms which are not held by

institutions because the expected commission revenues from selling
information do not match up with the initial fixed cost involved in
getting acquainted with the firm.

Typically,

therefore,

one might expect

analysts to ignore smaller firms which are shunned by institutional
investors due to liquidity problems.

However,

Arbel and Strebel

([1982],[1983]) have provided empirical evidence to show that firms with
low levels of analyst following earn higher risk-adjusted returns even
after controlling for size.
effect",

caused by low levels of analyst following,

instances,
[1982].

This suggests that the "neglected firm
may,

in some

dominate over the "firm-size" effect documented in Reinganum

Hence,

environment,

as a proxy measure for the firm’s information

the number of analysts following variable may add to the

explanatory value of the market capitalization variable.

This suggests

the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 2D
The lower the number of analysts following in the firm the higher
will be the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend
announcement.

Richardson [1984] observes that as the correlation between the
firm’s cash flows and the overall state of the economy (measured,
the gross national product)

increases,

say,

macro information increasingly

tends to preempt the information contained in a firm-specific signal.
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by

This suggests that the amount of prior information about the individual
firm available from macro information sources may,
define the firm’s information environment.

at least,

in part

Richardson uses the R

of the

market model as a surrogate for the correlation between the firm’s
earnings and macro-economic earnings.

Essentially the R

2

reflects the

underlying correlation between changes in the consensus estimates of firm
value and changes in the market index of stock prices.

We posit that

Hypothesis 2E
The lower the estimation period market model R

2

the higher will be

the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement.

The discussion so far suggests that the five proxy variables
enumerated above - namely,

market capitalization,

institutional equity holding,
equity,
model R

number of institutions holding the firm’s

number of analysts following,
2

- should reflect,

percentage of

and the estimation period market

in varying degrees,

available information about the firm.

However,

the amount of publicly
a full definition of the

firm’s information environment should encompass not only the amount of
publicly available information but also the quality of such information.
If the information available results in heterogenous beliefs,

then the

information environment is qualitatively weak since it generates
uncertainty.

Barry and Brown [1985] develop a theoretical model to show

that divergence of opinion is a decreasing function of the quality of
information available.

Moreover,

using the premise that the forecasts
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produced by financial analysts might proxy for market expectations,

Barry

and Brown [1984] suggest that divergence of analyst opinion be used as a
surrogate for ex-ante earnings uncertainty.

A number of recent empirical

examinations into this issue of heterogeneity in investor beliefs have
used the dispersion of analysts’

earnings forecasts to proxy for the

diversity of investor beliefs about future earnings.
findings of Ajinkya,

the

Atiase and Gift [1991] suggest that the degree of

heterogeneity in beliefs,
earnings forecasts,

For instance,

measured by the dispersion of analysts’

is a determinant of the intensity of trading.

To

examine the impact of qualitative differences in the information
environment on the magnitude of share price reactions to dividend
initiation announcements,

we formulate

Hypothesis 2F
The higher the dispersion of analysts’

earnings forecasts the

higher will be the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend
announcement.

3.3

Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment:

Volatility

Effects

This study also addresses the issue of whether the volatility of
security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement is
systematically associated with the firm’s information environment.

Kalay

and Lowenstein [1985] document substantial increases in the volatility of
security returns for the days surrounding the dividend announcement,
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largely due to high levels of uncertainty during such periods.

Patel1

and Wolfson [1979] and Christie [1983] also report that stock returns are
more volatile around other regularly scheduled announcements.

This study

contends that the increase in "event period" returns volatility should
also be a function of the firm’s information environment.
specifically,

More

our research question is

Is there an inverse association between the volatility of
security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement and
the firm’s information environment?

The volatility of security price reaction connotes the existence
of uncertainty or risk.

In this context,

the variance of the probability

distribution of the return on assets is used to measure risk.

Variance

measures the dispersion of probable returns to investors around the mean
or expected return at the end of the investment holding period.

This

suggests the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 3
The lower the firm’s information environment,

the higher will be

the variance or increase in variance during dividend initiation
announcements.

Tests of this hypothesis are conducted in the context of the information
environment proxy variables in the manner discussed in Section 3.2 above.
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3.4 Conclusion

The hypotheses developed in this Chapter represent the central
focus of the research issues being examined in this dissertation.

They

are tested using the data and methodology discusssed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 Endnotes

1.

The theoretical discussion is given in Verrechia [1979] and Atiase
[1980].

2.

The studies are by Mangiero [1988],
Choi and Kim [1989].

Eddy and Seifert [1988],
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and Brown,

CHAPTER 4
SAMPLE,

4.1

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Sample Selection Criteria

Exchange firms that initiated regular dividend payments during
the period January 1976 to December 1987 were identified from the CRSP
(Center for Research on Security Prices) daily master files.

1

The

announcement dates were cross-checked with the Moody’s Annual Dividend
Record and/or the Wall Street Journal Index.

The following additional

screens were applied to the dividend initiating firms

(i)

The firms should have had a complete history of daily returns
available on the CRSP tapes for a 100-day period prior to the
announcement date and contained no missing observations over the
week of the announcement.

This restriction was imposed in order to

ensure the availability of sufficient daily returns observations for
the statistical computations pertaining to abnormal price reactions.

(ii) The firms should have had no earnings announcement,

stock split

announcements or other "confounding" event within a ten-day window
surrounding the dividend announcement.

2

The ten-day confounding

event filter was applied to "isolate" the dividend information (Kwan
[1981]),

and thereby minimize any ambiguity associated with an

observed security price reaction at the time of the dividend
initiation announcement.
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Table 1

TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE BY THE
SAMPLE OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-1987.

Year

Number of Firms

1976

17

1977

10

1978

4

1979

5

1980

5

1981

3

1982

1

1983

4

1984

4

1985

6

1986

5

1987

16
80

Total

(iii) The ten-day confounding event filter was also applied to remove any
firms which had an ex-dividend day within the "screen" period.

3

This process yielded a "clean" sample of 80 dividend initiating
firms over the 12 year time-frame.

4

Details of the temporal break up of
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these firms Eire provided in Table 1 (on previous page).

From the table,

we note that there is a sizeable clustering of firm-events in the years
1976,

1977 ajid 1987.

yesir 1987 could,

The relatively large number of observations in the

at least,

in psirt have been motivated by the Tax Reform

legislation of 1986 under which capital gains are taxed at the same rates
as ordinary income from regular dividends.

4.2

The Dividend Expectation Model

The "naive" expectations model is used according to which any
change in dividends is unexpected.

This model is premised on the

assumption that the best prediction of dividends in time "q" made in time
"q-1" is the dividend paid at time "q-1".

The model is denoted by the

following equation

D*=D
q

where D

(1)

q-1

equals the dividend per share in the qthquarter,
q

D

is the
q-i

dividend per share in the previous quEirter,

Eind the asterisk denotes an

expectations operator.

Given equation (1),
time "q",

denoted by Du,
q

the measure of unanticipated dividends at

is therefore the percentage difference between

the actual dividend Einnounced for the qth quarter and the expected
dividend for that quarter.

This is shown as follows

50

D

u

(2)

q

D

or,

q
Du= ——
q
D
q

Substituting D
q-l

- 1

for D

q

(3)

from equation (1) and applying to equation (3),

we get
D

q
1

(4)

q-l

From equation (4),

the measure of unanticipated dividends,

denoted by Du,
q

is shown to be the percentage change in dividends from the previous
quarter.
According to Asquith and Mullins [1983],

this model is more

likely to accurately reflect investor expectations for initial dividends,
since such dividends are more likely to be unexpected (Asquith and
5
Mullins [1983]) than subsequent regular dividends.

Thus our

hypothesized dividend effects should be most visible at initiation.
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4.3

Data Sources for the Information Environment Proxy Measures

The next step is to delineate the "firms-events" according to
their information environments.
respective data sources,

The proxy variables,

and their

are described below.

(i) Size
Following Atiase [1985] and Bhushan [1989],

in this study market

capitalization is used as a surrogate for firm-size.

It is defined

as the market value of common equity at the end of the month
immediately prior to the month of the dividend initiation
announcement.

The relevant data is obtained from the CRSP daily

master tape.

(ii) Number of Institutions Holding the Firm’s Equity
The number of common shares held by institutions in the
pre-announcement month was obtained from the Standard & Poors Stock
Guide.

(iii) Percentage of Institutional Equity Holding
The percentage of institutional equity holding is computed as
follows:

The aggregate number of shares held by institutions
in the pre-announcement month.
___
The total outstanding common stock
of the firm.
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X

100.

(iv) Number of Analysts Following
Arbel and Strebel
firm effect",
instances,

[1982,

1983] have shown that the "neglected

caused by low levels of analyst following,

dominate over the "firm-size" effect.

Hence,

may,

in some

the number

of analysts following a firm may be a stronger measure of the extent
of prior firm-specific information available than its market
capitalization.
We define this measure as the number of analysts reporting
earnings forecasts for the firm in the month immediately preceding
the month of the dividend initiation announcement.

The data is

obtained from the IBES tapes.

(v) Correlation

Between

Firm-Earnings

and

Macro

Economy-wide

Earnings
2

The market model R is used as an information environment proxy
measure,

based on Richardson’s [1984] premise (see also Bhushan

[1989]) that a signal emitted by the management of a low R
be less preempted by macro information,

2

firm will

making it relatively more

informative to investors than a similar signal provided by the
2

management of a high R

(vi) Dispersion of Analysts’
This proxy,

firm.

Earnings Forecasts

it is premised,

will capture qualitative differences

across information environments since it connotes the existence of
CJ

heterogenous beliefs.

Such differences may not be fully reflected
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in the other proxy measures discussed earlier,

This measure is

represented by the standard deviation around the mean earnings
forecast provided by the IBES data tape deflated by the absolute
value of the mean forecast,

for the month immediately prior to the

month of the dividend initiation announcement.
Brown,

Richardson and Schwager [1987] observe that a

potential problem with the IBES dispersion measure is that the
forecasts used to calculate dispersion may not be contemporaneous
since the dates of the forecasts tend to vary.

The problem is not

severe if the age distribution of the forecasts is random cross¬
sect ionally.

Unfortunately,

the severity of the problem cannot be

ascertained as the age distribution of the forecasts is not given in
the IBES tapes.
[1988] and Morse,

Another potential problem,
Stephan and Stice [1991],

discussed in O’Brien
is the nonsynchronous

recording of analyst forecasts updates in the IBES data set.

O’Brien

finds an average delay of 34 trading days between a forecast update

g
by analysts and its inclusion in the IBES tapes.
Morse,

Stephan and Stice,

According to

this delay in the inclusion of analysts’

forecast updates in the IBES Summary History tape poses serious
problems in using estimates of the variance of analysts’
forecasts to measure the divergence of beliefs.

earnings

For instance,

if an

announcement causes all analysts to increase their forecasts by two
dollars,

there would be no change in the variance of analysts’

forecasts.

However,

if only one-half of the analyst updates are

reflected in the IBES tapes,

in a given month, an user of this data

base will find an apparent increase in the variance of forecasts in
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that month followed by a corresponding decrease when the analyst
updates do get incorporated into the IBES data set in a subsequent
month.
The information environment proxy variables,
sample of 80 dividend initiation announcements,
(on the next page).

We note,

from the Table,

ranges from 9.31 million to 3530.30 million,

pertaining to our

are calibrated in Table 2

that market capitalization
the percentage of

institutional equity holding ranges from 0 to 69,

the number of

institutions holding equity goes from 0 to a high of 215,
2

estimation period market model R
of 0.69.

ranges from a low of 0.00004 to a high

For the Number of Analysts Following proxy,

available for 17 firms on the IBES tapes.

data was not

Hence a two stage procedure

was followed in our analysis with regard to this proxy.
stage,

In the first

all the original 80 firm-event observations were included and we

assumed that the 17 firms,
tapes,

and the

for which data was not available on the IBES

had no analyst following.

In the second stage,

we excluded the 17

firms on the premise that there was insufficient information about the
extent of analyst following for these firms.

Table 2 presents

descriptive statistics for both of our samples of the Number of Analysts
Following proxy.

We note that the range for both samples is from 0 to

16.

4.4 Summary

This Chapter describes the manner in which the final sample of
dividend initiation announcements was compiled,

provides a temporal

distribution of this sample and discusses the rationale for using the
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Table-2

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT PROXY VARIABLES,
NAMELY % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION
(MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING (ANLST), IN THE CONTEXT OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS BY
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-87.

SAMPLE SIZE

MEAN

STD.DEV

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

INST

80

0. 12

0. 15

0.00

0.69

MKT.CAP
($ Millions)

80

224.98

549.45

9.31

3530.30

NINST

80

23.63

35.07

0.00

215.00

R2

80

0. 14

0. 13

0.00004

0.69

ANLST*(all firms)

80

1.94

3.03

0.00

16.00

ANLST**(IBES listed
firms)

63

2.46

3.22

0. 00

16.00

*

The sample
analyst

includes

not

listed by

IBES and assumed to

have no

following.

** The sample excludes
there

17 firms

is

following

firms not

insufficient
these

listed by

information about

IBES,

on the premise

the number

that

of analysts

firms.

"naive" expectations model to measure the magnitude of the
"unanticipated" dividend.

The data sources for the six information

environment proxy measures being examined in this study are described,
and relevant descriptive statistics tabulated.
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In Chapter 5,

we provide a description of the statistical tests

that are employed for an empirical examination of the data described in
this Chapter.
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Chapter 4 Endnotes

1.

The year 1976 was selected as the earliest year for the study because
the IBES data base, which was used to obtain data for two of the
information environment proxy measures - namely, the number of analysts
following in the firm and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecasts - begins from this year.

2.

Our selection of a "10 day" screen conforms to previous studies such as
Asquith and Mullins [1983],

3.

Eades, Hess and Kim [1985] note that occurrence of an ex-dividend day
in the event period leads to a significant positive excess return.

4.

This final sample of dividend initiation announcements is,
called "firm-events".

5.

Asquith and Mullins [1983] also observe that while other models (such
as the Fama-Babiak [1968] Earnings-based model) may produce superior
forecasts for a variable past series of dividends, such models collapse
into the "naive" model when confronted with a constant past series of
dividends.

6.

If the prior information results in heterogenous beliefs, then the
firm’s information environment is qualitatively poor as it causes
uncertainty (Barry and Brown [1984, 1985]).

7.

The earlier measures should proxy the amount of prior information

henceforth,

available and may not reflect qualitative differences in such
information.
8.

The 34 trading day lag, in O’Brien’s findings, has a standard deviation
of 44.5 days, indicating a highly skewed distribution.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY: A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS

The study is conducted using three overall categories of
statistical tests.

These are,

respectively,

the analysis of returns for

the individual information environment proxies, regression analysis,

and

the analysis of volatility.
The information environment proxy variables are individually
ranked in ascending order.
into low,

Then the sampled "firm-events" are classified

medium and high information environment levels and assigned to

one of different "information environment portfolios"

1

for the purpose of

testing the hypotheses of the study.

5.1

The Analyses of Returns
Tests of the "price reaction" hypothesis are conducted by

measuring abnormal returns around dividend initiation announcements.
each "firm-event" the market model,
risk effects,

For

which adjusts for both market and

is used to calculate an abnormal return (AR) for event day

t as follows

R

where R

it

it

(a

i

+

(1)

R )
i mt

is the rate of return on "firm-event" i for event day t,

R

mt

is

the rate of return on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
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value-weighted index on event day t,

and 0

are the

slope coefficients of the market model regression,
estimation period from t=-90 to t=-31.

intercept and the

which is run over an

These estimates provide unbiased

estimates of the expected daily return of the security relative to the
"firm-event
The abnormal return,

as defined,

is equal to the error term,

e

,

which occurs in the regression equation

E(R

it

) = ct

i

+ 0 R
i mt

(2)

and represents the difference between observed and expected returns.
market model does not,

however,

The

provide for shifts in Beta that may occur

as a result of the event under study.

Because the coefficients are

assumed to remain constant (stable) across time and events,

this model

may not accurately measure the abnormal return if there is a shift in the
security’s risk class (see Fama [1976]).
model is widely used in event studies,

Despite these limitations,

this

because "there is no evidence that

more complicated methodologies convey any (additional) benefit"

(Brown

and Warner [1980]).
The study concentrates on an examination of daily returns data as
this allows for the explicit identification and control of
contemporaneous confounding events (Aharony and Swary [1980]),

and

thereby increases the power of the statistical tests (Brown and Warner
[1980]

[1985]).
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Abnormal returns and mean standardized abnormal returns are
calculated for each "firm-event" over the interval -30 to +30 (t=-l,0 is
the "event-period").

Standardizing the abnormal returns provides a zero

mean and unit variance for each cross-section,
requirements for the t-test and F-test.
Brown and Warner [1985]

2

The test statistic described by

is the t-statistic relative to the Mean

Standardized Abnormal Returns.
+10

thereby satisfying the

For each day in the period t= -10 to t=

the test statistic is given by

t-statistic = SAR / s
t

t

(3)

p

A

where,

SAR

t

is the mean standardized abnormal return at time t,

and s

p

is

the estimated standard deviation of the mean standardized abnormal
returns over the period t=-90 to -31.

3

The statistic is distributed as

Student's "t" with n-1 degrees of freedom where n represents the number
of days over the estimation period.
To test for a significant difference between the MSAR’s of two
quintile distributions (say,
(t=—1,0),

1 and 2) on any day in the "event period"

the test-statistic is

t-statistic = (AR

l,t=0,-l

- AR

2,t=o,-1

)/

7~

/

pi

+ s

p2

- 2s

pl2

(4)
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A

where,

s

pi

and s

are the quintile 1 and quintile 2 standard deviations

p2

of the MSAR’s over the estimation-period comprising of n days,

and s

pl2

is defined as

s

pl2

= ( V

^
t=-90

[AR

l,t

- AR ]

This test statistic,too,

[AR

1

2,t

- AR ])/ n-1

(5)

2

has the Student’s "t" distribution.

To examine the Mean Standardized Abnormal Returns over various
intervals during the period t=-10 to t=+10 the test statistic is the
4

standardized mean cumulative abnormal return
over the interval t= T

1 i

,.,T

2i

_

(SCAR).

For firm-event i

the statistic is denoted as

5

T2i

SCAR

i

=

Z

SZAR

t=T

it

/

/ (T

2i

- T

li

+ 1)

(6)

li

For a sample of N firm-events,

the test statistic is

N

Z = V

u

i =1

(7)

SCAR / /~N
i
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As noted before,

each SAR.^ is assumed to be distributed unit normal in

the absence of abnormal performance.

Under this assumption, Z is also

unit normal.

5.2

Regression Analysis
The univariate tests described above may mask interaction effects

across the information environment proxy measures that could impact the
results.

Moreover,

an objective of the study is to statistically identify

the proxy variable(s) which best explain(s) the magnitude of security
price reaction at the time of dividend initiation announcement.

Hence,

the following cross-sectional regression model is estimated for each
firm-event SCAR pertaining to the event-period,

SCAR = 13 + /3 * LUDiv + 0 * LMKT. CAP +
i

0

1

+ 13 *
'

5

12

(3 *

13

t=-l,0

LINST + |3 * LNINST
14

LANLST + 13 * LDISP + /3 * LCORR + e
16

17

11

i

(8)

where,
SCAR = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for firm-event i in the
i

event period,

t=-l,0.

LUDivi = Natural log of "Unexpected" Dividend Initiation Yield amount
pertaining to each firm i.
LMKT.

CAPi = Natural log of the market value of equity of each firm i.

LINSTi = Natural log of the percentage of institutional holding in each
firm i.
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LNINST^ = Natural log of the number of institutions holding firm i’s
equity.
LANLST^ = Natural log of the number of analysts following firm i.
LDISP^ = Natural log of the standard deviation around the mean earnings
forecast deflated by the mean forecast,
LCORR^ = The R

2

for each firm i.

from the estimation period market model regression for

firm i.
e^= The error term in the regression equation for each firm i.

The natural log transformations of the independant variables serve to
provide linear estimates.

The simple linear model specified above is

estimated on the computer software package SHAZAM using ordinary least
squares regression.

The results are compared with the results obtained

from separate univariate regression estimates with the two day (t=-l,0)
Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return as the dependant variable and the
natural log of each information environment proxy variable as well as
dividend yield as the independant variable.

The independant variables

are scrutinized for multicollinearity by examining the correlation matrix
involving each of the explanatory variables.
Two other variants of the linear model outlined above are also
estimated and analyzed.

In the first auxiliary regression model,

explanatory variables remain as defined earlier.
however,

the

The dependant variable,

is now the absolute value of the two day (t=—1,0) Standardized

Cumulative Abnormal Return.

This analysis, exploratory in nature,

attempts to investigate the role of the independant variables in
explaining the absolute magnitude of the two day Standardized Cumulative
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Abnormal Return.

The second regression model is estimated using only the

positive Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return observations.

The

theoretical underpinning of our hypotheses detailed in section

above

suggests that,

in general,

dividend initiation announcements are

associated with statistically significant positive abnormal returns.
Hence,

theoretically,

none of the two day (t=—1,0) Standardized

Cumulative Abnormal Return observations should be negative.
therefore,

It would,

be interesting to statistically analyze the role of the

independant variables in explaining the magnitude of only the positive
two day Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns.

5.3

Analysis of Volatility
The "volatility" hypothesis tests for an increase in "event

period" volatility relative to the "estimation period" in order to
determine whether the increase is significantly higher for the "low"
information environment firms.
portfolio,

For each information environment

volatility (denoted as o*2)

is computed for each firm i as

follows

<r2=

[ Z (R
t=i

(9)

- R )2 ]/N

where
R^= the returns over period t,
N

R = the average return over period t (given by Z Rt/N )»
t=i
N = the number of observations.
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Hence,

for the estimation period,

over days t= -90,-31,
over days t= -3,0.

volatility is computed for each firm

whereas for the event period volatility is computed

Thereafter,

for each portfolio,

individual firm

estimation period and event period volatilities are totalled and average
volatilities are computed by dividing the summations by the number of
firms in the portfolio.
To examine differences between average estimation period and
event period variances,
computed,

2

where cr

eve

2

2

the volatility ratio given by <r

eve

/<r

is the average event period variance,

est

is
2

and <r

the average estimation period variance for each portfolio.

est

is

For a

detailed comparative assessment of estimation period and event period
variances for individual firms within each portfolio,

the ratios of these

variances are also computed for each firm-event observation.

5.4 Conclusion
The statistical methodology described in this Chapter is used to
analyze the data discussed in Chapter 4 with the objective of testing the
hypotheses detailed in Chapter 3.

In the next Chapter,

presentation of our empirical findings.
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we turn to a

Chapter 5 Endnotes

1.

A drawback of this approach is that it implicitly assumes that all
firms within a portfolio are homogenous in terms of prior information
availability, and therefore fails to recognize possible crosssectional differences in the magnitude of the information measures
within each portfolio (Lobo and Mahmoud [1989]).

2.

This period includes the event period of t=-l,0.

3. The standard deviation of the mean standardized abnormal returns over
the estimation period is computed as follows

-31

and,

AR = £
t=-90

where,

1/n-l AR

t

n = the number of days over the estimation period.

4. This statistic is fully described in Hite and Owers [1983] and Dodd and
Warner [1983].
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5.

SZAR.^ is computed by standardizing the abnormal return AR.t as
foilows:
SZAR = AR
it

it

/ s

,

it

where,

D.

s

it

=

+ 1 + (R
mt
D

/ Z (R

mTT
71=1

- R )2 ),

where

i

2

s, = residual variance of security i from the market model regression,
= range of observations during the estimation period,
R

mt

= rate of return on the market index for day t of the event period,

R = mean rate of return on the market index during the estimation period,
m

R

mTT

= rate of return on the market for day n of the estimation period.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The results obtained from our empirical analyses are presented in
this Chapter.

First,

our examination centers on the analysis of abnormal

returns for the overall sample of dividend initiation announcements as
well as for the subsamples of individual portfolios created for the
respective information environment proxies.

Thereafter,

the focus of the

study shifts to the analysis of the volatility of returns for the
individual portfolios within each information environment proxy.

The

i

results of the regression analysis are then reported.

The Chapter ends

with a comparative evaluation of the information environment proxy
variables.

6.1

Analysis of Returns

6.1.1

Abnormal Returns Study for Overall Sample
The first step in the analysis was to examine the magnitude of

abnormal returns relative to the entire sample of 80 dividend initiation
announcements.

Table 3 (on the following page) reports the average market

adjusted abnormal returns (AR),
abnormal return (CAR),

the cumulative sum of the daily average

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days

before to 10 days after the dividend initiation announcement, for this
sample.

We note that the two day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR is

2.19% with a z-statistic of 5.08,
the 0.01 level.

which is statistically significant at

Over 84% of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1, when the

AR is 1.84% with a t-value of 6.27,

which again is statistically
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Table-3

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-87.
Panel A :

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0.46

0.46

1.26

50

-9

-0.22

0.24

-0.61

44

-8

0.66

0.90

1.83

50

-7

0.25

1. 15

0.67

47

-6

-0.05

1. 10

-0. 13

46

-5

0.22

1.32

0.59

50

-4

0.01

1.33

0.03

44

-3

0.88

2.21

2.47

51

-2

0.03

2.24

0.08

49

-1

1.84

4.08

6.27

0

0.35

4.43

0.95

Date in
event time

* significant

Panel B:

at

the

.01

level

of

(t-statistic)

*

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

2. 19

5.08*

+ 1 to +2

0.34

1.22

+ 1 to +5

1.50

2.84

+1 to +10

2.25

2.85

-1 to

* significant

at

the

.01

level

of confidence.

70

% Positive

75
52

significant at the 0.01 level.

Moreover,

75% of the average ARs are

1
As reported in earlier studies ,

positive on this day.

much of the

impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to have been
captured on the day before publication in the Wall Street Journal since
the news is transmitted over the Broad Tape on that day.

From Table 3 we

also see that while the ARs for days -10 through -2 are insignificant,
there is potentially some leakage of information on day -3 when the AR is
0.88 with a t-value of 2.47.

Overall,

it is clear from Table 3 that

dividend initiation announcements appear to be associated with highly
significant abnormal returns.

6.1.2

Information Environment Proxy Data Portfolio Formation and
Abnormal Returns

We next sought to examine whether the magnitude of security
returns relative to the dividend initiation announcement had an inverse
association with the firm’s information environment.

For this purpose,

the analysis was conducted with the five proxy measures for the firm’s
information environment - namely,
holding,

market capitalization,

firm’s equity,

the percentage of institutional equity

the number of institutions holding the
2

the estimation period market model R , and the number of

analysts following.

Owing to limitations of data availability,

we were

unable to form separate portfolios for the dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecast proxy.

Hence, our examination of this proxy was

confined only to regression analysis and is discussed in detail in
Section 6.3.
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Table-4

A PROFILE OF PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING IN 80 EXCHANGELISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH
PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

% of Equity Held by
Institutions

Number of
Firms

0 to 1

18

over 1 to 3

10

4 to 7

10

8 to 10

9

over 0 to 15

12

16 to 25

9

26 to 47

9

48 to 69

3
Total

80

Descriptive statistics for the proxy measures are provided in
Table 2 on page 56.

The results of our analysis for the five information

environment proxy variables are sequentially provided below.

6.1.2.1

Percentage of Institutional Equity Holding
For each firm,

the percentage of institutional equity holding was

computed as of the month-end immediately preceding the month of dividend
initiation.

We classified the firms into low,

information environment levels,

medium and high

where 0-10% institutional equity holding
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was categorised as "low",
classified as "high".

10.1-25% as "medium" and above 25% was

From Table 4,

(see previous page) we note that

while the range of the percentage of institutional equity holding in the
sample firms goes from 0 to 69,
of 0 to 25%,

i.e.

over 85% of the firms fall in the range

in the "low" and "medium" ranges.

We next created two portfolios comprising of the "low" and the
"medium/high" firms,

respectively,

with 47 firms grouped in the "low"

portfolio and 33 firms in the "medium/high" portfolio (Table 5,
on next page gives a detailed breakout of these portfolios).
Panel A also reports the average dividend yield

2

Panel A,

Table 5,

and the dispersion

around the average dividend yield for the two portfolios.

It can be seen

that the average dividend yield (at 0.01057) for the "low" institutional
holding portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average yield for
the "medium/high" portfolio (0.005145),

mainly because,

on average,

the
3

"low" institutional holding firms tended to have lower share prices.
Past studies

4

have documented a positive association between the

magnitude of the initial dividend and the size of the announcement period
abnormal returns.

Hence,

in order to test for systematic differences in

announcement period abnormal returns across information environments,

it

is necessary to control for the separate confounding impact of the
magnitude of the dividend yield.

This connotes the necessity for similar

average dividend yields and standard deviations for the two portfolios.
A scrutiny of the "low" institutional holding portfolio revealed that
five firms had disproportinately high dividend yields relative to the
remaining firms in the portfolio.

We excluded these firms and

recomputed the averge dividend yield and standard deviation for this
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Table 5

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS IN THE MONTH
BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF
FIRMS IN WHICH THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS IS BETWEEN 0 TO 10
(THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP).
THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES
OF FIRMS IN WHICH THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS RANGES FROM 10.4
TO 69 (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP).
PANEL A:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Institutional
Holding Category

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Average
Std.Deviation

0% to 10%

47

0.01057

Above 10%

33

0.005145

PANEL B:

0. 014

0.0065

PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD!

Institutional
Holding Category

*

Number of
Firms

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Std.Deviation
Average

Number of
Firms

0% to 10%

42

0.006013

0.0054

Above 10%

33

0.005145

0.0065

After removal

of five firms with a mean dividend yield of more than

standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
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2.39

portfolio.

From Table 5,

Panel B,

(on previous page)

it can be seen that

the average dividend yields and standard deviations for the revised
portfolios (comprising,
much more comparable,

now of a total of 75 exchange-1isted firms) are

although the average dividend yield for the "low"

institutional holding category (at 0.006013)

is still larger than the

yield for the "medium/high" category ( 0.005145).

We assume that the two

portfolios are similar with respect to the magnitude of dividend yield.
Hence,

the final sample for the purpose of our price-study comprised of

75 exchange-1isted dividend initiating firms,

of which 42 belonged to the

"low" institutional holding group and 33 belonged to the "medium/high"
institutional holding group.
Tables 6 and 7 (on pages 76 and 77,

respectively) report the

average market adjusted abnormal returns (AR),
daily average abnormal return (CAR),

the cumulative sum of the

the t-statistic and the z-statistic

from 10 days before to 10 days after the dividend initiation
announcement,

for the "low" and "medium/high" institutional holding

groups respectively.

From Table 6,

the two day (t=-l,0) announcement

period CAR for the "low" institutional holding portfolio is 3.01% with a
z-statistic of 4.58,
level.

which is statistically significant at the 0.01

Over 85% of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1,

2.56% with a t-value of 6.56,
the 0.01 level.

when the AR is

which again is statistically significant at

From Table 6 we also see that the ARs for days -10

through -2 are insignificant.

Overall,

it is clear from Table 6 that

dividend initiation announcements by "low" institutional holding firms
appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal returns.
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Table-6
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’ ) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH 0-10% INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY
OWNERSHIP (THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP).
Panel A:

Daily Residuals

Date in
event time

AR (%)

CAR (%)

(t-statistic)

-10

0.63

0.63

1.26

-9

-0. 14

0.49

-0.28

-8

0.90

1.39

1.83

-7

0. 11

1.50

0.22

-6

0.35

1.85

0.70

-5

-0.03

1.82

-0.05

-4

0. 10

1.92

0.20

-3

0.65

2.57

1.31

-2

0.38

2.95

0.76

-1

2.56

5.51

6.56

-0

0. 45

5.96

0.90

* significant at the .01 level of confidence.
Panel B:

Interval Residuals

Periodl in
event time

(z-stati

CAR (%)

0

3.01

4.58

+ 1 to +2

0. 19

0.62

+ 1 to +5

1.93

2.69

+ 1 to + 10

2.05

2. 17

-1 to

* significant at the .01 level of confidence.
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*

Table-7
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 33 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY
OWNERSHIP RANGING FROM 10.4% TO 69% (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH % INSTITUTIONAL
HOLDING GROUP).

Panel A :

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0. 14

0. 14

0.30

-9

-0.50

-0.36

-1.04

-8

-0.06

-0.42

-0. 12

-7

0.64

0.22

1.33

-6

-0.74

-0.52

-1.57

-5

0.66

0. 14

1.39

-4

-0.07

0.07

-0. 13

-3

1.07

1. 14

2.30

-2

-0.61

0.53

-1.28

-1

1.07

1.60

2.30

0

0. 18

1.78

0.37

Date in
event time

* significant at the

Panel B:

.05 level

(t-statistic)

of confidence.

Interval Residuals.

Period in
event time

(z--statistic)

CAR (%)

0

1.25

2.53*

+1 to +2

0.68

1.22

+1 to +5

1.31

1.40

+1 to +10

2.91

2.03

-1 to

* significant at the

.05 level

of confidence.
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From Table 7,

the two day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for

the "medium/high" institutional holding group is 1.25% with a z-value of
2.53,

which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

the major amount of abnormal returns occurs on day -1,

Here too,

when the AR is

1.07% with a t-value of 2.30 (this value is statistically significant at
the 0.05 level).

Moreover,

while generally the ARs appears to be

insignificant from days -10 through -2,
leakage of information on day -3,

there does appear to be some

when the AR is 1.07 with a t-value of

2.30.
From Panel A of Table 26 (on page 109) we see that,

for both the

"low" and the "medium/high" portfolios, 76 % of the day -1 individual
abnormal returns are positive.

However, a difference of means test of

the ARs of the two groups on day t=-l yields a t-statistic of 2.54 which
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
In general,

a comparative assessment of Tables 6 and 7 reveals

that the association between dividend initiation announcements and
abnormal returns appears to be much stronger for the "low" institutional
holding firms than for the "medium/high" institutional holding firms.

6.1.2.2

Market Capitalization
For each of the 80 dividend initiating firms in the sample,

the

amount of market capitalization was computed as of the month-end
immediately preceding the month of announcement.
into "low",
manner;
"low",

Firms were classified

"medium" or "high" information environments in the following

firms with market capitalization upto $ 100 million were labelled
those with market capitalization ranging from $ 100 million to
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Table-8
A PROFILE OF THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION (IN DOLLAR MILLIONS) OF 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN
THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

Market Capitalization
^

Number of
Firms

9 to 25

9

over 25 to 50

15

over 50 to 75

13

over 75 to 100

7

over 100 to 125

10

over 125 to 150

8

over 150

4

to 175

over 175 to 425

8

over 425 to 800

0

over 800 to 1,000

3

over 1,000 to 4,000

3
80

Total

79

$ 425 million were categorized as "medium",

while firms with market

capitalization in excess of $ 425 million were classified as "large".
From Table 2,

presented on page 56,

we see that the amount of market

capitalization for the sampled firms ranged from $ 9.310 million to $
3,530.30 million.
that,

However,

we note from Table 8,

(on previous page)

similar to the percentage of institutional equity holding proxy,

the majority (95 %) of the firms were in the "low" and "medium"
information environment ranges.
Two portfolios were created comprising of the "low" and the
"medium/high" market capitalization firms,

respectively,

with 44 firms

grouped in the "low" portfolio and 36 firms grouped in the "medium/ high"
portfolio (Table 9,
statistics on

Panel A,

on next page,

these portfolios).

provides descriptive

Table 9,

Panel A also reports the

average dividend yield and the dispersion around the average dividend
yield for the two portfolios.

Once again,

the average dividend yield for

the "low" market capitalization portfolio (0.0107)

is almost twice as

high as the average yield for the "medium/ high" market capitalization
portfolio (0.006123),

mainly because the "low" market capitalization

g
firms also tend to have lower priced stocks.

To control for the

separate confounding impact of the magnitude of dividend yield,

we

reexamined the "low" market capitalization portfolio to determine whether
any firms had disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other
firms in that portfolio.
firms from the portfolio.

The scrutiny resulted in the exclusion of 5
The average dividend yield of these firms at

0.03983 was 2.24 standard deviations away from the average portfolio
dividend yield.

Table 9,

Panel B (on the following page) describes the
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Table 9

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION IN THE MONTH
BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.
ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF
FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION BELOW $100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET
CAPITALIZATION GROUP).
THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS WITH
MARKET CAPITALIZATION ABOVE $100 MILLION AND BELOW $4,000 MILLION (THE
MEDIUM AND HIGH MARKET CAPITALIZATION GROUP).
PANEL A:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Market Capitalization
Category
upto $100 million
(low)

Number of
Firms

Dividend Yield
Average
Std.Deviation

44

0.01017

36

0.006123

0.0130

above $100 million
and
below $4,000 million
(medium and high)

PANEL B:

0.0104

PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Market Capitalization
Category
upto $100 million
(low)
above $100 million
and
below $4,000 million
(medium and high)

Dividend Yield
Std.Deviation
Average

Number of
Firms
39

0.005932

0.0034

36

0.006123

0.0104

* After removal of five firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.24
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
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characteristics of the revised portfolios,

comprising of 75 firms of

which 39 represent the "low" market capitalization category and 36
represent the "high" market capitalization category.

From Table 9,

Panel

B we note that the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are
quite similar,

although the average yield for the "low" market

capitalization portfolio (at 0.005932)

is a little lower than the average

yield for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.006123).
Tables 10 and 11 report the average market adjusted abnormal
returns (AR),
(CAR),

the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days

after the dividend initiation announcement,

for the revised "low" and

"medium/high" market capitalization groups,

respectively.

Table 10,

As reported in

(on the next page) the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR

for the "low" market capitalization portfolio is 3.36% with a z-statistic
of 5.11,

which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

this two-day CAR accrues on day -1 (83.3 %),
t-value of 7.01,
level.

Most of

when the AR is 2.80% with a

which again is statistically significant at the 0.01

Here too,

much of the impact of the dividend initiation

announcement appears to have been captured on the day before publication
in the Wall Street Journal since the news is transmitted over the Broad
Tape on that day.
-10 through -2,

From Table 10,

we also see that for all of the days

the abnormal returns are insignificant.

institutional holding proxy,

Similar to the

dividend initiation announcements by "low"

market capitalization firms also appear to be associated with highly
significant abnormal returns.
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Table-10

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 39 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION
RANGING FROM $ 9 MILLION TO $ 100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET CAPITALIZATION
GROUP).
Panel A:

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

(t-statistic)

-10

0.90

0.90

1.75

-9

-0.24

0.66

-0.45

-8

0. 09

0.75

0. 17

-7

0. 11

0. 86

0.22

-6

-0.06

0.80

-0. 11

-5

0.41

1.21

0.79

-4

0.32

1.53

0.60

-3

0.72

2.25

1.39

-2

0.33

2. 58

0.63

-1

2.80

5.38

7.01*

0

0. 56

5.94

1.07

Date in
event time

*

significant

Panel B:

at

the

.01

level

of

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

3.36

5. 11*

+1 to +2

0. 12

0.23

+1 to +5

1.49

1.24

+1 to +10

2.45

1.62

-1 to

*

significant

at

the

.01

level

of

confidence.

83

Table 11 (on page 85) presents a somewhat different picture with
respect to the "medium/high" market capitalization group.

We see that

the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio is 0.72 %
with a z-statistic of 1.88,
the 0.10 level.

which is statistically significant only at

Much of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 when the AR is

0.89% with a t-value of 2.09 (this t-value is statistically significant
at the 0.10 level).

Moreover,

while generally the ARs appear to be

insignificant from days -10 to -2,

there appears to be some leakage of

information (albeit insignificant) on day -3.

7

From Panel B of Table 26 we see that 77% of the day -1 individual
abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio,
positive for the "medium/high" portfolio.

while 69 % are

A difference of means test of

the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 3.29,
which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Our analysis of Tables 10 and 11,
reported in Table 26,

Panel B,

together with our findings

suggests that the association between

dividend initiation announcements and abnormal returns appears to be much
stronger for the "low" market capitalization firms than for the
"medium/high" market capitalization firms.

Hence,

our preliminary

conclusions for the market capitalization proxy are similar to (and
somewhat stronger than) those for the institutional holding proxy.

6.1.2.3

The Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity

As in the case of the percentage of institutional equity holding,
discussed above,

the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity was
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Table-11

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION
RANGING FROM $ 100 MILLION TO $ 4,000 MILLION (THE MEDIUM AND LARGE
MARKET CAPITALIZATION GROUP).

Panel A:

Daily Residuals.

Date in
event time

AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

-0. 11

-0. 11

-0.25

-9

-0.26

-0.37

-0.59

-8

0.48

0. 11

1.09

-7

0. 13

0.24

0.29

-6

-0.09

0. 15

-0.21

-5

0. 12

0.27

0.27

-4

-0. 46

-0. 19

-1.04

-3

0.49

0.39

1. 11

-2

-0.33

-0 03

-0.74

-1

0.89

0.86

0

-0. 17

0.69

*

Significant

Panel B:

at

the

.10

level

of

(t-statistic)

2.09*
-0.39

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z--statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

0.72

1.88*

+1 to +2

0. 52

1.41

+1 to +5

1.71

2.92*

+1 to +10

2. 42

2.67*

-1 to

*

significant

at

the

.10

level

of

confidence.
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Table-12

A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY IN 80
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN
THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.
No of Institutions
Holding Equity

Number of
Firms

0 to 1

7

2 to 5

15

6 to 10

15

11 to 15

13

16 to 25

10

26 to 40

7

41 to 50

3

60 to 85

6

86 to 100

2

150 to 215

2
80

Total

also computed as of the month-end immediately preceding the month of
dividend initiation.

Firms were classified into low,

information environment levels as follows;

medium and high

a range of 0 to 10

institutions holding the firm’s equity was classified as "low",
was classified as "medium",
Table 12,

11 to 25

and above 25 was categorised as "high".

From

(presented above) we see that while the range of the number of

instututions holding equity in the sampled firms stretches from 0 to 215,
75% of the firms fall within 0 to 25,

i.e.

categories.
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in the "low" and "medium"

Two portfolios (detailed in Table 13,

Panel A on page 88) were

created comprising of the "low" and the "medium/high" firms,
respectively,

with 38 firms grouped in the "low" portfolio and 42 firms

in the "medium/high" portfolio.

From Table 13,

Panel A,

it can be seen

that the average dividend yield (at 0.009468) for the "low" portfolio is
disproportionately higher than the average yield for the "medium/high"
g
portfolio (0.007460).

To control for the separate confounding impact of

the magnitude of dividend yield,

we reexamined the "low" portfolio to

determine whether any firms had disproportionately high dividend yields
relative to other firms in that portfolio.
exclusion of 3 firms from the portfolio.
the 3 firms,

at 0.03497,

The scrutiny resulted in the
The average dividend yield of

was 2.69 standard deviations away from the

portfolio mean dividend yield.

Table 13,

Panel B,

(also on the following

page) describes the characteristics of the revised portfolios,

comprising

now of 77 firms of which 35 represent the "low" category of the number of
institutions holding equity and 42 represent the "medium/high" category.
From Table 13,

Panel B,

we note that the average dividend yields for the

two portfolios are quite similar (0.007683 and 0.007460,

respectively).

Tables 14 and 15 report the average market adjusted abnormal
returns (AR),
(CAR),

the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days

after the dividend initiation announcement,
"medium/high" groups,

respectively.

for the revised "low" and

From Table 14,

on page 89,the two-

day (t=—1,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 3.97%
with a z-statistic of 5.38,
0.01 level.

which is statistically significant at the

Most of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1 ( 72%) when
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Table 13

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING THE FIRM’S EQUITY.
ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
HOLDING EQUITY DOES NOT EXCEED 10 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER
PORTFOLIO ("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDERS EXCEEDS 10.

PANEL A:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Number of
Firms

Number of
Institutions
Holding Equity
not exceeding 10

38

0.009468

0.009949

greater than 10

42

0.007460

0.013641

PANEL B:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD!

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Std. Deviation
Average

Number of
Firms

Number of
Institutions
Holding Equity

*

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Average
Std. Deviation

not exceeding 10

35

0.007683

0.007324

greater than 10

42

0.007460

0.013646

After

removal

of

three

standard devistions

firms

with

away from the

a

mean dividend

average

yield of

portfolio
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more

than

dividend yield.

2.69

Table-14
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR') AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 35 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
HOLDING EQUITY UPTO 10 (THE LOW NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP).
Panel A:

Daily Residuals.

Date in
event time

AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0.54

0.54

0.94

-9

-0.50

0.04

-0.87

-8

0.66

0.70

1. 15

-7

-0.21

0. 49

-0.36

-6

-0.28

0.21

-0. 49

-5

-0. 12

0.09

-0.21

-4

0.24

0.33

0.41

-3

0.39

0.72

0.67

-2

0.36

1.08

0.62

-1

2.87

3.95

6.25

0

1. 10

5.05

1.95

*

Significant

Panel B:

at

the

.01

level

of

(t-statistic)

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

3.97

5.38

+ 1 to +2

0.66

1.23

+ 1 to +5

2.87

3.28

+ 1 to + 10

3.07

2.77

-1 to

Significant

at

the

. 01

level

of

confidence.
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*

the AR is 2.87% with a t-value of 6.25,
significant at the 0.01 level.
-2,

g

which again is statistically

Moreover,

the abnormal returns are insignificant.

results contained in Table 14,

for all the days -10 through
Overall,

our analysis of the

suggests that dividend initiation

announcements by firms with lesser number of firms participating in the
equity also appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal
returns.
Table 15,

presented on the following page,

provides a markedly

different picture with respect to the "medium/high" group.

The two-day

(t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio is 0.85% with a zstatistic of 2.19,

which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

All of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 when the AR is 1.19% with a
t-value of 3.18 (statistically significant at the 0.05 level).
the AR (at -0.34%) undergoes an insignificant reversal
In general,

over the interval of days from -10 to -2,

be insignificant.
t-value of 3.3

10

,

However,

on day -3,

On day 0,

(t-value=-0.85).
the ARs appear to

when the AR is at 1.23% with a

there appears to be a sizeable leakage of information.

In general,

our analysis of Tables 14 and 15 suggests that the

association between dividend initiation announcements and abnormal
returns appears to be much stronger for firms with "low" numbers of
institutions holding equity than for the "medium/high" group.
Panel C of Table 26 shows that 74% of the day -1 individual
abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio,
76% are positive for the "medium/high" portfolio.

and approximately

However,

the ARs for

the "low" portfolio are significantly higher than the ARs for the
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Table-15
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS
HOLDING EQUITY RANGING FROM 11 TO 215 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP).
Panel A :

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0.27

0.27

0.66

-9

-0.05

0.22

-0. 14

-8

0.53

0.75

1.32

-7

0.58

1.33

1.47

-6

-0.06

1.27

-0. 16

-5

0.57

1.84

1.44

-4

-0. 15

1.69

-0.36

-3

1.23

2.92

-2

-0.24

2.68

-1

1. 19

3.87

0

-0.34

3.53

Date in
event time

*

significant

Panel B:

at

the

.05

level

of

(t-statistic)

3.30*
-0.60
3. 18*
-0.85

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

0.85

2. 19*

+1 to +2

0.28

0.78

+1 to +5

0.68

1. 15

+1 to +10

1.74

1.43

-1 to

*

significant

at

the

.05

level

of

confidence.
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"medium/high" portfolio.

A difference of means test of the ARs of the

two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 2.79,
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Thus,

which is

the results for this

proxy are similar to the percentage of institutional holding and the
market capitalization proxies discussed earlier.

6.1.2.4

The Estimation Period Market Model R* 2
For each firm,

the R

2

the market model regression was used to compute

between firm-specific returns and the returns on the CRSP value-

weighted index over the estimation period t=-90 to t=-31,
event period t=-l,0.

Firms were classified into low,

information environment levels as follows;
were classified as "low",

those with R

2

relative to the

medium and high

firms with R

2

less than 0.11

between 0.11 and 0.20 were
2

classified as "medium",

and those with R

higher than 0.20 were

categorized as "high".

From Table 2 we see that the estimation period R

2

for the sampled firms ranges from 0.00004 to 0.69.

Moreover,

from Table

16 (on page 93) we find that over 71% of the sampled firms fall in the
"low" and "medium" categories.
Two portfolios (detailed in Table 17, Panel A, on page 94) were
created comprising of the "low" and the "medium/high" firms,
respectively,
17,

Panel A,

with 40 firms grouped in each of the portfolios.

From Table

it can be seen that the average dividend yield (at 0.010309)

for the "low" portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average
yield for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.006624).

Since our objective

was to have similar average dividend yields for the two portfolios,
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we

Table-16

A GROUPING OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE
PERIOD 1976-1987 ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2

Estimation Period
Market Model R2

Number of
Firms

upto 0.005

6

>0.005 to 0.015

7

0.020 to 0.050

8

>0.050 to 0.110

20

>0.110 to 0.200

16

>0.200 to 0.300

15

>0.300 to 0.400

6

>0.500 to 0.700

2
80

Total

reexamined the "low" portfolio to determine whether any firms had
disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other firms in that
portfolio.

The scrutiny resulted in the exclusion of 4 firms from the

portfolio.

The mean dividend yield of these firms at 0.051576 was 2.653

standard deviations away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
Table 17,

Panel B,

portfolios,

describes the characteristics of the revised

comprising now of 76 firms of which 36 represent the "low"

category of the number of institutions holding equity and 40

93

Table 17
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON EACH FIRM’S 60 DAY ESTIMATION PERIOD R2 OF THE MARKET
MODEL.
ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD
R2 IS LESS THAN 0.11.
THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD R2 EQUALS OR EXCEEDS 0.11.

PANEL A:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Estimation
•
1
Period R~ Category
T-.

,

Number of
Firms

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
7
PT7
7
77
7
I 7
Average
Std. Deviation

t i .

less than 0.11

40

0.010309

0.015556

greater than or equal to
0. 11

40

0.006624

0.007872

PANEL B:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD.

Estimation
-2Period R Category

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Average
Std. Deviation

Number of
Firms

less than 0.11

36

0.006315

0.007549

greater than or equal to
0. 11

40

0.006624

0.007874

* After removal of four firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.65
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
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represent the "medium/high" category.

From Table 17,

Panel B,

we note

that the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are quite similar
(0.006315 and 0.006624,

respectively).

Tables 18 and 19 report the average market adjusted abnormal
returns (AR),
(CAR),

the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days

after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" and
"medium/high" groups,

respectively.

From Table 18,

(presented on the

following page) the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for the
"low" portfolio is 2.67% with a z-statistic of 3.94,
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

which is

Most of this two-day CAR

accrues on day -1 ( over 85%) when the AR is 2.29% with a t-value of
5.11,

which again is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Moreover,

for all the days -10 through -2,

insignificant.
18,

Overall,

11

the abnormal returns are

our analysis of the results contained in Table

suggests that dividend initiation announcements by low R

2

firms

appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal returns.
However,

the results are not as strongly significant as for the three

proxies discussed earlier.
Table 19,
group.

on page 97,

presents the results for the "medium/high"

The two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio

is 1.95% with a z-statistic of 3.46,
at the 0.05 level.

which is statistically significant

Much of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 (over 85%)

when the AR is 1.67% with a t-value of 3.62 (statistically significant at
the 0.05 level).

Similar to the results reported for the "medium/high"
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Table-18
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH ESTIMATION PERIOD
MARKET-MODEL R2 LESS THAN 0.11.
Panel A:

Daily Residuals

-0.08

-9

0. 48

0.40

0.91

-8

0. 11

0.51

0.21

-7

-0. 12

0.39

-0.22

-6

-0.62

-0.23

-1. 18

-5

0. 15

-0.08

0.28

-4

-0.31

-0.39

-0.59

-3

0.50

0. 11

0.94

-2

-0.49

-0.38

-0.92

-1

2.29

1.91

5. 11

0

0.38

2.29

0.72

Significant

Panel B:

at

the

.01

level

i

00

i
of

(t-statistic)

confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

2.67

3.94*

+ 1 to +2

0.65

0.87

+ 1 to +5

2.28

2.35

+ 1 to + 10

1.95

1.63

-1 to

*

01

-10

*

CAR (%)

o
►->

AR (%)

o
o

Date in
event time

Significant

at

the

.01

level

of

confidence.
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Table-19

DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 40 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD
MARKET-MODEL R2 EQUAL TO OR EXCEEDING 0.11.

Panel A:

Daily Residuals.

Date in
event time

AR (%)

CAR (%.)

-10

0.88

0.88

1.79

-9

-0.90

-0.02

-1.85

-8

0.88

0.86

1.79

-7

0.69

1.55

1.39

-6

0.41

1.96

0.81

-5

0.52

2.48

1.04

-4

0.41

2.89

0.81

-3

1.20

4.09

2.47

-2

0. 45

4.54

0.90

-1

1.67

6.21

3.62

0

0.28

6. 49

0.55

*

significant

at

the

.05

(t-statistic)

level.

Panel B: Interval Residuals.
CAR(%)
Period in
event time

(z-statistic)

-1 to 0

1.95

3.46

+1 to +2

0.26

1.09

+1 to +5

1.20

1.97

+1 to +10

2.85

2.53

*

Significant

at

the

.05

level.
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*

*

*

portfolios for the proxies discussed earlier,

there appears to be a

sizeable leakage of information on day -3 when the AR is at 1.20% with a
t-value of 2.47.
general,

12

Otherwise,

the ARs for the days -10 through -2 are,

in

insignificant.
Panel D of Table 26 shows that 78% of the day -1 individual

abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio,
positive for the "medium/high" portfolio.

and 75% are

A difference of means test of

the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded an insignificant
t-value of 1.01.
The findings suggest that the association between dividend
initiation announcements and abnormal returns is not very different
2

between the "low" R

2

firms and the "medium/high" R

firms.

Our results,
2

therefore, appear to indicate that the estimation period market model R
may not be a powerful, explanatory proxy for the firm’s information
environment.

6.1.2.5

The Number of Analysts Following
For each firm,

the Number of Analysts Following was obtained for

the month immediately preceding the month of the dividend initiation
announcement,
80 firms,

from the IBES tapes.

13

However,

from the original sample of

data was not available for 17 firms on the IBES tapes.

Hence,

a two stage procedure was followed in the classification of firms into
low,

medium and high information environment levels.

we assumed that the 17 firms,
IBES tapes,

In the first stage,

for which data was not available on the

had no analyst following.

In the second stage,

we excluded

the 17 firms on the premise that there was insufficient information about
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Table-20
A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING IN 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED
DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR
TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT.

Number of
Firms

No of Analysts
Following
0

33

1

18

2

9

3

2

4

8

5

3

6

2

8

2

10

1

14

1

16

1
80

Total
*

Includes

17

firms

not

listed

by

IBES

and

assumed

to

have

no

analyst

following.

the extent of analyst following for these firms.
analyses,

firms were classified into low,

environment levels as follows;
designated as "low",

For both sets of

medium and high information

firms with 0 and 1 analyst following were

those with the number of analysts following between

99

2 and 6 were classified as "medium",

and those with analyst following in

excess of 6 were categorized as "high".

From Table 2,

on page 56,

we see

that the Number of Analysts Following for both the sets of sampled firms
ranges from 0 to 16.

Moreover,

from Table 20,

(presented on page 99) we

find that over 93% of the sampled firms fall in the "low" and "medium"
categories,

for our first stage analysis.

92% fall into these categories

for the second stage analysis.
In the first stage,
A,

two portfolios (detailed in Table 21,

Panel

on the following page) were created comprising of the "low" and the

"medium/high" firms,

respectively,

with 51 firms grouped in the "low"

portfolio and 29 firms in the "medium/high" portfolio.
Panel A,

we note that,

From Table 21,

as in the case of the proxy variables discussed in

the earlier sub-sections,

the average dividend yield (at 0.010407) for

the "low" portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average yield
for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.005018).

A reexamination of the "low"

portfolio with the objective of excluding any firms which might have had
disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other firms in that
portfolio resulted in the exclusion of 6 firms.

The mean dividend yield

of these firms at 0.040436 was 2.20 standard deviations away from the
average portfolio dividend yield.

Table 21,

characteristics of the revised portfolios,

Panel B, describes the

comprising now of 74 firms of

which 45 represent the "low" category of the number of analysts following
and 29 represent the "medium/high" category.

We see, from the table,

that now the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are quite
similar (0.005787 and 0.005018,

respectively).
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Table 21

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE FIRMS. ONE
PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING
DOES NOT EXCEED 1 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO
("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING EXCEEDS 1.

Panel A:

Portfolio Grouping Before Controlling for Dividend Yield.

Number of
Analysts
Following

Number of
Firms

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Average
Std. Deviation

not exceeding 1

51

0.010407

0.013641

greater than 1

29

0.005018

0.008426

Includes

17 firms not

listed by

IBES and assumed to

have no

analyst

following.

**

Panel B:

Portfolio Grouping After Controlling for Dividend Yield.

not exceeding 1

*

greater than 1

*

Includes

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Std. Deviation
Average

Number of
Firms

Number of
Analysts
Following

14

firms not

45

0.005787

0.004472

29

0.005018

0.008426

listed by

IBES and assumed to

have

no

analyst

follow!ng.
** After removal of six firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.20
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
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Tables 22 and 23 report the average market adjusted abnormal
returns (AR),
(CAR),

the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days

after the dividend initiation announcement,
"medium/high" groups,

respectively.

for the revised "low" and

From Table 22,

on page 103,

the

two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 2.77%
with a z-statistic of 4.37,
0.01 level.

which is statistically significant at the

Over 83% of this two-day CAR is concentrated on day -1 when

the AR is 2.30% with a t-value of 5.72,
significant at the 0.01 level.

14

which again is statistically

This suggests,

once again,

that much of

the announcement effect is captured on day -1 when the news is released
over the Broad Tape.
information on day -3,

Apart from a possible significant leakage of
for all of the days -10 through -2,

returns are insignificant.
contained in Table 22,

Overall,

the abnormal

our analysis of the results

suggests that dividend initiation announcements by

firms with low analyst following appear to be associated with highly
significant abnormal returns.

However,

the results are not as strongly

significant as for the percentage of institutional equity holding,

market

capitalization and number of institutions holding proxies discussed
earlier.
Table 23,

on page 104,

"medium/high" group.

presents the results for the

The two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for

this portfolio is 1.49% with a z-statistic of 2.87,
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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which is

Since the AR on day 0 is

Table-22
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 45 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST
FOLLOWING NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).
17 OF THESE SAMPLED FIRMS ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE
NO ANALYST FOLLOWING.
Panel A:

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0.39

0.39

0.80

-9

0.05

0.44

0. 10

-8

0. 37

0.81

0.75

-7

0.25

1.06

0.52

-6

-0.54

0.52

-1. 12

-5

0.34

0.86

0.68

-4

0.38

1.24

0.77

-3

1.02

2.26

2. 13

-2

0.03

2.29

0.06

-1

2.30

4.59

5.72

0

0.47

5.06

0.95

Date in
event time

* Significant

Panel B:

at

the

.01

level

(t-statistic)

of confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

2.77

4.37

+ 1 to +2

0.20

0.54

+ 1 to +5

1.71

2.43

+ 1 to + 10

2.42

2.35

-1 to

* Significant

at

the

.01

level

of confidence.
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Table-23
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 29 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING RANGING FROM 2 TO 16 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING GROUP).

Panel A :

Daily Residuals.
AR (%)

CAR (%)

-10

0.27

0.27

0.61

-9

-0.77

0.50

-1.77

-8

0.84

0.34

1.91

-7

0.04

0.38

0. 10

-6

0.46

0.84

1.02

-5

0.02

0.86

0.05

-4

-0.84

0.02

-1.93

-3

0.60

0.62

1.35

-2

-0. 15

0.47

-0.33

-1

1.53

2.00

3.74

0

-0.04

1.96

-0.09

Date in
event time

* significant

Panel B:

at

the

.05

level

(t-statistic)

of confidence.

Interval Residuals.
(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time
0

1.49

2.87*

+1 to +2

0.68

1.43

+1 to +5

1.77

2. 18

+1 to +10

2.61

2.06

-1 to

* significant

at

the

.05

level

of confidence.
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*

-0.04%,

all of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1

when the AR is 1.53%

with a t-value of 3.74 (statistically significant at the 0.05 level).
Moreover,
-9 and -4,

apart from sizeable negative ARs of -0.77% and -0.84% on days
generally the ARs appear to be insignificant from days -10 to

-2.

Panel E of Table 26 (page 109) reports that,
and the "medium/high" portfolios,
returns are positive.

However,

76% of the day -1

for both the "low"
individual abnormal

a difference of means test of the ARs of

the two groups on day t=-l yields an insignificant t-statistic of 1.37.
The second stage of our analysis was based on the premise that
for the 17 firms not

listed in the IBES tapes there was insufficient

information available about the extent of analyst following.

Hence,

these 17 "firm-events" were excluded from the "low" analyst following
portfolio.

A separate analysis was conducted with the remaining 63

"firm-events",

of which 34 belonged to the "low"

group and 29 belonged to the "medium/high" group.
A,

presented on the following page,

information environment
15

From Table 24,

Panel

it can be seen that the average

dividend yield (at 0.009838) for the "low" portfolio is
disproportionately higher than the average yield for the "medium/high"
portfolio

(0.005018).

A subsequent scrutiny of the "low" portfolio

revealed that 4 firms had a mean dividend yield of 0.046720 which was
2.66 standard deviations away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
We,

therefore,

excluded the 4 firms with disproportionately high dividend

yields from the portfolio.

Table 24,

Panel B,

characteristics of the revised portfolios,
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describes the

comprising now of 59 firms of

Table 24

A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE FIRMS. ONE
PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING
DOES NOT EXCEED 1 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO
("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING EXCEEDS 1.

PANEL A:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD

Number of
Firms

Number of
Analysts
Following

Dividend Yield (per Quarter)
Average
Std. Deviation

*
not exceeding 1

34

0.009838

0.013890

greater than 1

29

0.005018

0.008426

PANEL B:

PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD^* **

Dividend Yield (per Quart
Std. Deviation
Average

Number of
Firms

Number of
Analysts
Following
*

*

not exceeding 1

30

0.005886

0.003606

greater than 1

29

0.005018

0.008426

Excludes

17 firms

insufficient

not

listed by

information about

IBES on the

the extent

premise that

of analyst

there

is

following on these

firms.
** After removal of four firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.66
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield.
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which 30 represent the "low" category of the number of analysts following
and 29 represent the "medium/high" category.

We note that the average

dividend yields for the two portfolios are now quite similar (0.005886
and 0.005018,

respectively).

Table 25,
abnormal returns
return (CAR),

on next page,
(AR),

reports the average market adjusted

the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal

the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to

10 days after the dividend initiation announcement,
group,

in the second stage of analysis.

for the revised "low"

From Table 25,

the two-day (t=-

1,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 3.77% with a
z-statistic of 4.85,
level.

which is statistically significant at the 0.01

Day -1 accounts for over 85% of the two-day CAR with an AR of

3.21% and a t-value of 6.72,
the 0.01

level.

which again is statistically significant at

For the interval of days -10 through -2,

returns are insignificant.
contained in Table 25,

Overall,

the abnormal

our analysis of the results

suggests that dividend initiation announcements by

firms with low analyst following appear to be associated with highly
significant abnormal returns.

Moreover,

these results appear to be

sizeably stronger than the results for the "low"

information environment

group in the first stage analysis.
The results for the "medium/high" group (detailed in Table 23
above) have already been discussed above.
Panel E of Table 26

(page 109) shows that 83% of the day -1

individual abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio.
"medium/high" portfolio the figure is 76%.
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For the

A difference of means test of

Table-25
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 30 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST
FOLLOWING NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).
THIS SAMPLEEXCLUDES 17 FIRMS NOT LISTED ON IBES ON THE PREMISE THAT THERE
IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF ANALYST FOLLOWING IN THESE
FIRMS.
Daily Residuals.
CAR (%)

-10

0. 52

0.52

0.84

-9

to
o
6
i

0. 46

-0. 10

-8

-0.30

0. 16

-7

0. 23

0.39

0.36

-6

-0. 42

-0.03

-0.68

-5

0.66

0.63

1.06

-4

0.52

1. 15

0.83

-3

0.29

1.44

0.46

-2

0. 13

1.57

0.21

-1

3.21

4.78

6.72

0

0.56

5.34

0.89

Date in
event time

(z-statistic)

CAR (%)

Period in
event time

(t-statistic)

0

3.77

4.85

+1 to +2

-0.25

-0.39

+1 to +5

1.73

1.97

+1 to +10

2.01

1.60

-1 to

*

Significant

at

the

.01

level

of

CO

AR (%)

i
o

Panel A:

confidence.
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*

*

Table-26
AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), T-STATISTIC AND THE
PERCENTAGE OF AR POSITIVE ON DAY -1 RELATIVE TO THE WSJI DIVIDEND
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT DATE (DAY 0) FOR LOW AND MEDIUM/HIGH INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT FIRMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT. CAP), NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY (NINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2
(R2) AND NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) PROXIES.
THE T-VALUES
WITHIN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS BETWEEN THE LOW
AND MEDIUM/HIGH PORTFOLIOS FOR THE RESPECTIVE PROXIES.
Information
environment
proxy
Panel A:

N

% Inst.

AR (%)

t-statistic

Holding

Low

42

2.56

Medium/high

33

1.07

6.56*
**
2.30

39

2.80

Medium/High

36

0.89

Panel C:

76

Market Cap

Low

(Diff.

76

( 2.54**)

(Diff of Means)
Panel B:

% Positive

7.01*
**
2.09

Inst.

69

( 3.29*)

of Means)
No.

77

Holding

Low

35

2.87

6.25*

74

Medium/High

42

1. 19

3. 18*

76

(Diff.
PaneID:

( 2.79*)

of Means)
R2

Low

36

2.29

5. 11*

78

Medium/High

40

1.67

3.62*

75

(Diff.
Panel E:

(

of Means)
No.

Anlst.

1.01 )

Following

Low (all firms)

45

2.30

5.72*

76

Low (only firms
listed in IBES)
Medium/High

30

3.21

6.72*

83

29

1.53

3.74
(

(Diff of Means)

*

1.37 )

( 2.54**)
a.

N

represents

the

number

of

firms

*

Significant

at

the

0.01

level.

**

Significant

at

the

0.05

level.

within

each portfolio.
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76

the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 2.54,
which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
When we consider only IBES listed firms in our second stage
analysis,

the association between dividend initiation announcements and

abnormal returns appears to be much stronger for the "low" analyst
following firms than for the "medium/high" firms.

These results are

consistent with our findings for the first three proxies discussed
earlier.

The results for the "low" analyst following firms from our

first stage analysis are considerably less strong.

Hence,

our

preliminary conclusions for the Number of Analysts Following proxy are
somewhat mixed.

Our second stage analysis with the sample of 63 "firm-

events" does appear to indicate that this is a powerful,
proxy for the firm’s information environment.

However,

available for all of the 80 "firm-events" in our sample,

explanatory
had data been
this conclusion

might have been further reinforced.

6.2

Analysis of Volatility

Table 27 (see the following page) compares the estimation period
and event period average daily return variances for the five
measures analyzed in Section 6.1.
capitalization (MKT.CAP),
(INST),

proxy

We note that for the market

percentage of institutional equity holding

and the number of institutions holding equity (NINST) proxies,

the "low" information environment category,

the ratios of average event

period (t=-3,0) variances to average estimation period (t=-90,-31)
variances are approximately 1.63,

1.53 and 1.81 respectively.

However,

for the "medium/high" information environment firms, average event
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Table 27

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD (T=-3,0)
AVERAGE DAILY RETURN VARIANCES ACROSS INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO
GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND
THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING PROXIES.

2

<r

eve

Information
Environment
Panel A:

Avg. Estimation
period daily cr

Na

% Inst.

Avg. Event
period daily <r

2

<r

est

Holding

Low

42

0.000986

0.001505

1.52643

Medium/High

33

0.000899

0.000902

1.00407

«

Panel B:

Market Cap

Low

39

0.000964

0.001569

1.62776

Medium/High

36

0.000765

0.000707

0.92430

Panel C:

No.

Holding

Inst.

Low

35

0.000911

0.001648

1.80890

Medium/High

42

0.001081

0.000874

0.80851

Low

36

0.000848

0.001269

1.49590

Medium/High

40

0.001059

0.001179

1.11330

Panel D:

Panel E:

R2

No.

Anlst Following

Low (all firms)

45

0.001202

0.001369

1.13864

Low (only firms
listed in IBES)

30

0.001105

0.001596

1.44448

Medium/High

29

0.000753

0.001024

1.35989

a.N represents

the

number

of firms for

which the average

variance has

been estimated.
* Since
have

the

variable

added a value

ANLST has a
of 0.01

to

large number
it

of

values equal

before computing

Ill

its

to zero,

logarithmic

we

value.

period variances are actually lower than average estimation period
variances for the MKT. CAP and NINST proxies (cr2

eve

/cr2

est

is 0.92430 and

0.80851 respectively) and approximately the same for the INST proxy
2

(<r

eve

2

/(r

est

= 1.00407).

While the increase in event period volatilities

for "low" information environment firms suggests heightened uncertainty
around dividend initiation announcements,

the results for the

"medium/high" information environment firms suggest a lesser degree and
an earlier resolution of uncertainty surrounding dividend initiations.
These latter findings differ from the conclusions of Kalay and Lowenstein
[1985] who report substantial increases in security returns volatility
around dividend announcements.

16

2
For the ANLST and R proxies,

average

event period variances are higher than estimation period variances in
both the "low" and the "medium/high" portfolios.

For the second stage

analysis of the ANLST proxy involving 59 firms listed by IBES,

the ratio

of variances is higher for the "low" information environment portfolio
(1.4445 relative to 1.3598).
proxy

17

,

however,

For the first stage analysis of the ANLST

the ratio of variances is higher for the "medium/high"

portfolio 1.3598 relative to 1.1386).

For the R2 proxy,

the ratio of

variances is higher for the "low" information environment portfolio
(1.4959 relative to 1.1133).
These findings are,

in general,

further substantiated in Table

28 (on pages 113 and 114) which reports the analysis of variance ratios
for individual firms in each information environment portfolio.
instance,

Panel B of the Table reports findings for the MKT.

CAP proxy.

We note that for 51% of the "low" market capitalization firms,
variance ratio is greater than 2,

while for 28% of the firms,
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For

the
the ratio

Table 28

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD (T=-3,0)
DAILY RETURN VARIANCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRM-EVENTS ACROSS INFORMATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET
CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING
PROXIES.
THE NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF FIRM-EVENTS IN THE RESPECTIVE PORTFOLIOS.
Information
Environment

Panel A:

°/

Ratio of Event period to Estimation period
Number (and %) of firms in the categories of
( > 1 but < 2)
( > 2)
( 0 to < 1)

N

Inst.

Holding

Low

42
(100)

13
(31)

13
(31)

16
(38)

Medium/High

33
(100)

14
(43)

7
(21)

12
(36)

Panel B:
—

Market Cap

(100)
Medium/High

36
(100)

Panel C:

No.

Inst.

N represents

the

19

11

(53)

(31)

(51)
6
(16)

number

of

10

8

(57)

firms for

(51)

(26)

24

42

18

9

(23)

(100)

a.

(21)

8

(100)
Medium/High

(28)

Holding
35

Low

20

8

11

39

Low

(24)

(19)

which the

average variance

has

been estimated.

continued on next page
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Table 28 (continued)

Information
Environment

Panel D:

Ratio of Event period to Estimation period cr
Number (and %) of firms in the categories of
( 0 to < 1)
( > 1 but < 2)
( > 2)

Na

R2

Low

36
(100)

12
(34)

11
(30)

13
(36)

Medium/High

40
(100)

15
(37)

11
(28)

14
(35)

Panel E:

No.

Anlst Following

Low (all firms)

45
(100)

19
(41)

13
(28)

14
(31)

Low (only firms

30
(100)

11
(36)

8
(18)

11
(36)

29
(100)

11
(38)

9
(31)

9
(31)

listed in IBES)
Medium/High

a.

N represents the

number

of

firms for

which the .average

variance

has

been estimated.

is less than 1.

However,

for the "medium/high" group, only 16% of the

individual firms have variance ratios greater than 2,
firms have variances ratios less than 1.
for the NINST proxy.
less powerful.

Hence,

Similar results are reported

The results for the INST,

R2 and ANLST proxies are

except for the INST proxy,
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whereas 53% of the

for which the results

reported in Table 27 are really quite powerful and are not substantiated
by the findings reported in Table 28,

in general the two sets of findings

tend to corroborate one another.

6.3

Regression Analysis

6.3.1

Analysis with Actual Values of Event Period SCAR

Separate regressions were run,
dividend initiation observations,
dependant variable.

in six different stages,

using the

with the two day (t=—1,0) SCAR as the

The first two stages of analyses used the entire

sample of 80 dividend initiation observations.

18

In the first stage,

six

univariate regressions were run with the natural logs of Percentage of
Institutional Equity Holding (LINST),

Market Capitalization (LMKT.

Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity (LNINST),
Analysts Following (LANLST),

10

presented in Table 29,

2

on page 116,

have their expected signs - i.e.

0.01 + Number of

Estimation Period Market Model R

and Dividend Yield (LUDIV) as independant variables.

CAP),

(LC0RR),

The results,

indicate that all the coefficients

the coefficients for the natural logs of

the information environment proxy variables have negative signs whereas
the coefficient for the natural log of Dividend Yield has a positive
sign.

Moreover,

LINST,

LMKT.

while the t-values relative to the coefficients for

CAP,

at the 0.10 level,
significant.

LNINST,

LANLST and LUDIV are statistically significant

the t-value relative to LC0RR is not statistically

We also note that the coefficient for LMKT.

CAP has the

highest significant t-statistic followed by the coefficients for LINST,
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Table 29

RESULTS OF FIVE SEPARATE REGRESSIONS WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.
THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERMS OF THE FIVE
RESPECTIVE REGRESSIONS. THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND INITIATING
FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE NO
ANALYST FOLLOWING.

Independant
Variables

Coefficient

t-statistic

F-statistic

Adjusted R2

LINST

-0.72080
(0.53502)

-2.5994a
(0.5784)

6.757

0.0679

LMKT. CAP

-1.4955
(9.2615)

-3.7088a
(4.9646a)

13.755

0.1390

LNINST

-0.7638
(4.3851)

-1.9743a
(4.1866a)

3.898

0.0354

LCORR

-0.0746
(2.3819)

-0.2633
(2.7115a)

0.069

-0.0119

LANLST*

-0.3286
(2.0719)

-1.8243a
(3.6202a)

3.328

0.0286

0.4774

1.7639a

3. Ill

0.0260

(4.9374)

(3.4435a)

LUDIV

a.

Significant

* Since
have

the

at

the

variable

0.10

level

ANLST has a

added a value of

0.01

to

of confidence.

large number
it

of values equal

before computing

its

to

zero,

logarithmic

we

value.

2

LNINST,

LANLST and LUDIV.

The F-statistic and the Adjusted R

independant variables follow a similar order of magnitude.
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for the

Table-30

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT
VARIABLES.
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE
COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES).
THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND
INITIATING FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO
HAVE NO ANALYST FOLLOWING.
SCAR =

/3

i

+

o

/3

Coefficient
Estimates
7.6054
(2.5886)

+

0.118
at

the 0.10

the variable

5

level

to

(3

13

LNINST

-1.5066
(-2.5698 )

LANLST +

/3

16

i

0.5289
(0.9562)

LUDiv +
i

e

i

0.1662
(0.5731)

of confidence.

ANLST has a

added a value of 0.01

LMKT. CAP +

-0.0128
(-0.0591)

0.0326
(0.1263)

Adjusted R2:

have

13

i

2.764

13

12

-0. 4748
(-1. 5483)

4

F-Statistic:

* Since

LI!NST +

£ LCorr +

Coefficient
Estimates

a.Significant

l

large number
it

before

of values equal

computing

its

to

zero,

logarithmic

we

value.

The second stage involved running a multivariate regression with
the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST,
LNINST,

LANLST,

LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables.

given in Table 30 above,

LMKT.

CAP,

The results,

indicate that the t-value relative to the

coefficient for LMKT CAP is still statistically significant at the 0.10
level.

However,

none of the other coefficients are statistically

significant at the 0.10 level.
LMKT.

CAP,

LINST,

po

Moreover,

while the coefficients for

LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs,

117

the

Table 31

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG
OF NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.
THE
VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE REGRESSION. THE
SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 63 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED
BY IBES.
Independant
Variables

Coefficient

-0.5716
(2.3171)

LANLST*

a.

Significant

at

the 0.10

t-statistic

F-statistic

-2.5102a
(3.8209a)

level

6.301

Adjusted R‘

0.0788

of confidence.

coefficients for LNINST and LCORR show positive signs.

The reason for

the unexpected positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high
level of col1inearity,
variables.

21

particularly with the LMKT.

CAP,

LINST and LANLST

The regression has an F-statistic of 2.764 which with (7,73)

degrees of freedom is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
The third and fourth stages of analyses used a sample of 63
dividend initiation observations.

22

The purpose of this part of the study

was to reexamine the results for the LANLST variable using only firmevent observations for which the Number of Analysts Following was
definitely known.

Hence,

regressions was run,
results,

in the third stage,

a single univariate

with LANLST as the independant variable.

The

presented in Table 31 above indicate that the coefficient (at

-0.5716) has the expected negative sign with a t-value of -2.5102 which
is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
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The regression has an

F-statistic of 6.301 and an adjusted R2of 0.0788.

A comparison of Table

31 with Table 29 also shows considerably stronger results for the LANLST
variable with 63 IBES listed firm-event observations for which
information regarding the Number of Analysts Following is available than
for the full sample of 80 observations.
The fourth stage involved running a multivariate regression,
the 63 firm-events,

with the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant

variable and LINST,

LMKT.

independant variables.

CAP,

LNINST,

The results,

LANLST,

LCORR and LUDIV as

given in Table 32 (on page 120),

indicate that the t-value relative to the coefficient for LMKT CAP,
less than the t-value reported in Table 30,
significant at the 0.10 level.

However,

none of the other coefficients
23

Moreover,

while the coefficients for LMKT.

LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs,
LNINST and LCORR show positive signs.

while

is still statistically

are statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
the results of Table 30,

for

CAP,

similar to
LINST,

the coefficients for

Once again,

the reason for the

unexpected positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high level of
col1inearity,
variables.

particularly with the LMKT.

LINST,

and LANLST

The regression has an F-statistic of 2.411,

(7,56) degrees of freedom,
level.

CAP,

with

is statistically significant at the 0.10

The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.120.

results of Table 32,

which,

A comparison of the

with those contained in Table 30,

reveals a stronger

coefficient and t-statistic for the LANLST variable but weaker values for
the LMKT.

CAP and NINST variables for the 63 firm-events for which the

Number of Analysts Following is definitely known.

119

Table 32

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT
VARIABLES.
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE
COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES).
THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 63 DIVIDEND
INITIATING FIRMS, ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED BY IBES.
SCAR =

(3

i

Coefficient
Estimates

+

0

(3

1

/3 LMKT. CAP +

LINST +
i

2

6.6609 -0.6297
(1.8537)(-1.5204)

+

£ LCorr +
4

0.0506
(0.1589)

Coefficient
Estimates

^ LUDiv +

-0.1087
(-0.3213)

0.3627
(0.9417)

5

i

6

i

0.7899
(1.0302)

-1.2984
(-1.7616*)

LANLST*+

13

i

/3 LNINST

13

i

e

i

F-Statistic: 2.411
Adjusted R2: 0. 120
a.Significant

* Since
have

at

the 0.10

the variable

level

of confidence.

ANLST has a

added a value of 0.01

to

large
it

number

of values equal

before computing

its

to zero,

we

logarithmic

value.

Finally,

the fifth and sixth stages of analyses used a sample of

26 dividend initiation observations.
the Dispersion of Analysts’

24

The purpose,

here,

was to examine

Earnings Forecasts Variable as a proxy for

the firm’s information environment.
univariate regression was run,

Hence,

in the fifth stage, a single

with the natural log of the Dispersion of
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Table 33

RESULTS ZF TEE SECESSION •THE THE TJC DAY (T*-1.0> STANDARD .TO Ml'AN
t -e
zt
he zzeendmh variable, and tr: \
\
OF Z:SEEESI3v ZF ANALYSTS' EARNINGS ETRECASTS <LITSP> AS lNDEPENDANT
VARIABLE
THE .TIES IS PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT VERM OK 1'UK
REGEESSIOfc THE SM«£ COrSUSES OF 2S DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, All OK
WHICH ARE LZSTEE EE ZEES AS HAVING NDRE THAN ONE ANALYST FOLLOWING,

Independs.-*
Varisc les

Coefficient

t-statistic

0- 9585
[4.6278)

1.1302
(1.6914*)

LDISP

a.

Siy.:f:^am

Analysts’
results,

a*

~Jx

Z.1Z

Ist?;

F-stat1stic

Adjusted H"

1.277

0.0110

of confidence.

Earn inns Forecasts (LDISP) as the independant variable.

The

presented in Cable 33 above indicate that the coefficient has

the expected positive sign with a statistically significant t-value at
the 0.10 level.

The regression has an F-statistic of 1.277 and an

adjustec R* of 0.0110,

which are less strong than in the earlier

regressions.
The sixth stage involved running a multivariate regression with
the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST,
LNINST,

LAKLST25,

26 firm-events.

LDISP,

LMKT.

LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables,

The results,

given in Table 34,

indicate that,

CAP,

for the

apart

from the coefficient for LUDIV which is statistically significant at the
0.10 level, none of the other coefficients are statistically significant.
The coefficients for LMKT.

CAP,

LDISP,

LUDIV and LCORR maintain their
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Table 34

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST), THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS
FORECASTS (LDISP) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT
VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 26 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS,
ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED BY IBES AS HAVING MORE THAN ONE ANALYST
FOLLOWING.

SCAR

=

i

Coefficient
Estimates

13

a.

Significant

+

/3 LINST +
1

4

i

0.7278
(0.6358)

LCorr +
i

-0.4308
(-0.5091)

Coefficient
Estimates

Adjusted R2:

O

18.431
(1.9047a)

+

F-Statistic:

0

|3 LMKT. CAP +
2

-0.6299
(-0.6060)

LANLST +
s
i
0.8859
(0.5463)

(3

f3

i

13

6

3

LNINST

i

0.3663
(0.1529)

LDISP +
i

1.3574
(1.3676)

13

7

LUDiv +
i

e

i

1.8387
(1.7527a)

1.012
0.0032

at

the 0.10

level

of confidence.

expected signs.

The coefficients for LINST,

LNINST and LANLST show

positive signs.

While interpretation of the results in Tables 33 and 34

is certainly limited by the small sample of 26 observations,
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we do get an

indication that the Dispersion of Analysts’

Earnings Forecasts might be a

reasonably good proxy for the firm’s information environment.
Overall,

from the regression results,

it appears that Market

Capitalization,

followed closely by the Percentage of Institutional

Equity Holding,

is perhaps the most powerful explanatory

proxy variable

for the information environment amongst those being examined in this
study.

The Number of Analysts Following also appears to be a powerful

proxy.

However,

our conclusions with regard to this variable have been

somewhat weakened by the non-availability of "analyst following" data for
17 firm-events.
good proxy,

The Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity,

appears to be less powerful.

section 6.1.2.4,

while a

Consistent with the findings of

the regressions appear to indicate that the estimation
2

period market model R

may not be a good proxy for the firm’s information

environment.

our examination of the Dispersion of Analysts’

Finally,

Earnings Forecasts as a proxy variable has been constrained by the modest
sample of 26 observations.

This variable appears to be a reasonably

powerful proxy and merits later investigation with larger samples.

6.3.2

Analysis with Absolute Values of Event Period SCAR

So far,

our results from the regressions indicate that Market

Capitalization,

and,

to a lesser extent,

the Percentage of Institutional

Equity Holding,

appear to best explain the information environment,

amongst the proxy variables being examined in the study.
the robustness and consistency of these findings,
two separate auxiliary regression models.
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To investigate

we conducted tests on

In the first instance,

we ran

Table-35

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY
HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL
R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE
PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE
COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY
IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE NO ANALYST FOLLOWING.

SCAR =
i

(3

o

+

3 LINST +
l

Coefficient
Estimates
8.7710
(3.9089)

+

-0.0547
(-0.3302)

Adjusted R2:

0. 158

* Since
have

-1.3342
(-2.9798a)

0.0317
(0.1608)

i

the 0.10

5

level

of 0.01

to

i

0.4603
(1.0897)

3 LUDiv +
6

i

i

e

i

0.1749
(0.7899)

of confidence.

the variable ANLST has a
added a value

/3 LNINST

13

3 LANLST*+

3.462

at

2

3 LCorr +

F-Statistic:

a.Significant

3 LMKT. CAP +

-0.2827
(-1.2069)

4

Coefficient
Estimates

i

large
it

number

of values equal

before computing

its

to

zero,

logarithmic

we

value.

a multivariate regression with the absolute magnitude of the two-day
(t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST,

LMKT.

LANLST,

The results,

LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables.

Table 35 above,

CAP,

LNINST,
given in

indicate that the t-value relative to the coefficient for
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LMKT CAP is statistically significant at the 0.10 level,

and somewhat

stronger (at -2.9798) than the t-value reported in Table 30 (-2.5698),
although the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is somewhat less.

A

comparison of the results presented in Table 35 with the results reported
in Table 30 also reveals a corresponding decline in the estimated
coefficient and t-values for the percentage of institutional equity
holding proxy (-0.2826 and -1.2069 reported in Table 35 compared with
-0.4748 and -1.5483,

respectively,

reported in Table 30).

similar to the findings given in Table 30,
LMKT.

CAP,

LINST,

Moreover,

while the coefficients for

LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs,

coefficients for LNINST and LC0RR show positive signs.

the

The reason for

the positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high level of
col 1inearity,
variables.

26

particularly with the LMKT.
The regression,

CAP,

LINST and LANLST

reported in Table 35,

has a higher F-

statistic of 3.462 which with (7,73) degrees of freedom is statistically
significant at the 0.10 level.
Hence,

from this multivariate auxiliary regression model,

market

capitalization appears even stronger as a proxy variable whereas the
explanatory power of the percentage of institutional equity holding proxy
is somewhat weakened.

To further substantiate this conclusion,

we

conducted an exploratory univariate regression test with the absolute
magnitude of the two-day (t=—1,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and

LMKT.
(on

CAP as the independant variable.
page 125),

regression,

The results, given in Table 36

appear to confirm the findings from the multivariate

since the t-value for the LMKT.

CAP variable is now -4.2678.
2

The regression has an F-statistic of 18.291 and an Adjusted R
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of 0.1796.

Table 36

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT.CAP) AS INDEPENDANT
VARIABLE.
THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE
REGRESSION.

Independant
Variables

Coefficient

LMKT.CAP

a.

-1.3154
(9.7096)

Significant

Overall,

at

the 0.10

level

t-statistic

-4.2768a
(6.8240a)

F-statistic

Adjusted R'

18.291

0.1796

of confidence.

these results are stronger than those obtained from the

univariate regression with the actual "event period" SCAR as the
dependant variable and LMKT.

CAP els the independant variable,

reported in

Table 29 on page 115.

6.3.3
Our

Analysis with the Positive Event Period SCAR observations

hypotheses,

detailed in Chapter 3,

underpinning that,

rests on the theoretical

in general, dividend initiation announcements are

associated with statistically significant positive abnormal returns.
Hence,
the

it would be interesting to statistically probe into the role of

independant variables in explaining the magnitude of only the
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Table-37

RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY
HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL
R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE
PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE
COMPRISES OF 55 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS.

SCAR =

p

+

p LINST +

10

1

Coefficient
Estimates
10.2440
(3.7958)

(3 LMKT. CAP +

12

-0.3709
(-1.2088)

p LNINST
3

i

i

0.5336
(0.8848)

-1.4492
(-2.4884a)

*

+
Coefficient
Estimates

F-Statistic:
2

Adjusted R :
a.Significant

P LCorr +
4

i

p LANLST +
5

i

p LUDiv
6

i

-0.1419

0.0015

0.3985

(-0.4110)

(0.0067)

(1.4390)

3.296
0.203

at

the

0.10

level

of confidence.

positive two day Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns.
therefore,

ran a multivariate regression with only the positive two-day

(t=—1,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST, LMKT.
LANLST,

LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables.

comprised of 55 firm-event observations.
above,

We,

CAP,

LNINST,

The total sample

The results,

given in Table 37

largely corroborate our findings for the auxiliary regression with
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Table 38

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0)
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE,
AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT.CAP) AS INDEPENDANT
VARIABLE.
THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE
REGRESSION.
Independant
Variables

Coefficient

-1.5351
(11.0930)

LMKT. CAP

a.

Significant

at

the 0.10

level

t-statistic

F-statistic

-3.9626a
(6.0596a)

15.701

Adjusted R‘

0.2140

of confidence.

the absolute magnitudes of the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns
with respect to the market capitalization and percentage of institutional
equity holding proxies.
LINST,

Moreover,

while the coefficients for LMKT.

LCORR and LUDIV maintain their expected signs,

for LNINST and LANLST show positive signs.

CAP,

the coefficients

The reason for the positive

signs on LNINST and ANLST is possibly because of a high level of
col 1inearity,
Hence,

particularly with the LMKT.

CAP,

and LINST variables.

from this multivariate auxiliary regression model as well,

market

capitalization appears to gain in strength as a proxy variable whereas
the explanatory power of the percentage of institutional equity holding
proxy is somewhat weakened.
We also conducted an exploratory univariate regression test with
the positive values of the two-day (t=-1,0) SCAR as the dependant
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variable and LMKT.
in Table 38,

CAP as the independant variable.

on page 128,

multivariate regression.
variable is -3.9625.
Adjusted R

2

The results, given

appear to confirm the findings from the
From the Table,

the t-value for the LMKT.

CAP

The regression has an F-statistic of 15.701 and an

of 0.2140.

Overall,

these results too are stronger than

those obtained from the univariate regression with the actual "event
period" SCAR as the dependant variable and LMKT.
variable,

CAP as the independant

reported in Table 29.
Overall,

the auxiliary regression results discussed in Sections

6.3.2 and 6.3.3 above appear to confirm our earlier conclusions that
Market Capitalization,

and,

to a lesser extent. Percentage of

Institutional Equity Holding,

are perhaps the most powerful explanatory

proxy variables for the information environment amongst those examined in
this study.

6.4

Post Dividend Initiation Dispersion of Analysts*

Table 39,

Earnings Forecasts

presented on the following page, provides a comparative

reading of the DISP variable in the pre-announcement month with the DISP
variable in the post-announcement month,
available data.
subsample,

From the Table,

for the 26 observations with

we note that for 14 firms, or 54% of the

there is a decline in the dispersion of earnings forecasts.

This suggests a greater degree of consensus amongst analysts’

after the

initiation announcement,

possibly resulting from its informational value.

In 6 instances,

(23% of the subsample) there is an increase in

however,

dispersion.

129

Table-39

A COMPARISON OF THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS IN THE
MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT WITH THE DISPERSION OF
ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT
FOR 26 FIRMS

No.

of Firms

% of Firms

Increase in Dispersion

6

23

Dispersion Unchanged

6

23

14

54

26

100

Decrease in Dispersion
Total

6.5

A Comparative Evaluation of the Proxies

A question might arise as to whether the proxies,
INST,

MKT.CAP,

NINST,

particularly

and ANLST are highly correlated and,

effect proxying for one another.

therefore,

in

Tables 40 to 42 give the correlation

matrices of the proxies for different firm-event observations.
gives the correlation matrix of five of the proxies
all of the 80 firm-event observations.

28

27

,

Table 40

in the context of

From the table,

we see that the

correlation coefficient between MKT.CAP and NINST is the highest
(0.5378).

Surprisingly,

the correlation coefficient between INST and

NINST is somewhat lower at 0.5055.
is highest with NINST (0.5111),

The correlation coefficient of ANLST

followed by MKT.
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CAP (0.5009) and INST

Table-40

A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 80
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS.

VARIABLES

INST

MKT.CAP

NINST

R2

ANLST

INST

1.0000

MKT.CAP

0.2357

1.0000

NINST

0.5055

0.5378

1.0000

R2

0.1391

0.1626

0.0823

1.0000

ANLST*

0.4347

0.5009

0.5111

0.2926

* The sample
analyst

(0.4347).
0.2357.

includes

17 firms not

listed by

IBES and assumed to

have

1.0000

no

following.

The correlation coefficient between MKT.CAP and INST is
The R2proxy has low correlation coefficients with each of the

four other proxies.

This finding is consistent with our analysis in

sections 6.1 and 6.3 which showed marked differences in the results
obtained from the R2 proxy relative to the other proxies.

Table 41

excludes the 17 firms not listed by IBES and provides the correlation
matrix for 63 firm-event observations for which information pertaining
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Table-41

A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 63
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS.

INST

VARIABLES

MKT.CAP

NINST

R2

ANLST

INST

1.0000

MKT.CAP

0.1871

1.0000

NINST

0.4644

0.5283

1.0000

R2

0.1009

0.2140

0.0840

1.0000

ANLST*

0.5018

0.5214

0.5335

0.4146

* The
is

sample

excludes firms not

insufficient

listed by

information about

IBES,

the number

on the

premise

that

of analysts following

1.0000

there
these

firms.

to the ANLST variable is definitely available.

We note that the

correlation coefficient between ANLST and NINST is now the highest
(0.5335) followed by MKT.CAP and NINST (0.5283).

The ordering of the

correlation coefficients between ANLST and MKT. CAP (at 0.5214) and ANLST
and INST (0.5018) remain the same as in Table 40,
of the coefficients are now higher.

although the magnitudes

The correlation coefficient of INST

with NINST (0.4644) and MKT.CAP (0.1871) remain relatively low.
again,

Once

the R2 proxy has low correlation coefficients with each of the

other four proxy variables.
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Table-42
A CORRELATION MATRIX OF SIX PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET
MODEL R2 (R2), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) AND THE
DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS (DISP) FOR 26 DIVIDEND
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS.

VARIABLES

INST

MKT.CAP

NINST

R2

ANLST

INST

1.0000

MKT. CAP

0.0269

1.0000

NINST

0.6220

0.6990

1.0000

-0.1036

0.1778

0.1545

1.0000

0.2948

0.4216

0.6362

0.4274

1.0000

-0.1111

-0.1036

0.0534

0.0875

-0.1402

R2
ANLST
DISP

* This correlation matrix pertains to
number

of analysts following

26

exceeded

"firm-events" for
1

and the

DISP

1.0000

which the

mean and standard

deviation of analysts earnings forecasts were positive from the

IBES

tapes.

Finally,

Table 42,

reported above,

provides a correlation matrix

of all six proxy variables (including DISP) for 26 firm-event
observations.

The purpose of this matrix is to observe the correlation

of the DISP variable with the other variables.

From the table,

we note

that DISP does not appear to be strongly correlated with any of the other
variables.

133

In general,

the results reported in Tables 40 to 42 do not

suggest a sizeable overlap between any of the proxies discussed.
each of the six proxies appear to have separate identities,
separate analyses.
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Hence,

and merit

Chapter 6 Endnotes

1.

See,

for instance,

Asquith and Mullins [1983].

2.

The average dividend yield was computed in the following steps:
i) The CRSP Daily Master distribution code as well as the Wall Street
Journal Index were scanned to determine the nature of each dividend
initiation - i.e whether it represented a quarterly, semi-annual or
an annual payment.
In cases where the payment was semi-annual or
annual in nature, the absolute amount of the dividend initiation
was corrected in order to make it comparable with a quarterly
payment.
This was done by dividing each semi-annual payment by two
and each annual payment by four.
ii) The dividend yield for each firm was computed by dividing this
"revised" absolute dividend by the share price on the day of the
initiation announcement.
Finally, the average dividend yield was
computed by dividing the total dividend yield within each portfolio
by the number of firms in the portfolio.

3.

In this context, one point of interest is that, on average, the
absolute magnitude of the dividend was higher at $ 0.113 for the
"medium/high" institutional holding firms as opposed to $ 0.098 for
the "low" institutional holding firms.

4.

For instance,

5.

The mean dividend yield for these five firms at 0.045196 was 2.39
standard deviations from the average portfolio dividend yield.

6.

This phenomenon has been well documented in prior studies
instance, Kross [1985].

7.

Earlier, Table 5 had presented similar evidence of leakage of
information of a much greater magnitude on day -3 for the
"medium/high" institutional holding category.
We attribute this
occurrence to some observations which are common to the two portfolio
groups.

8.

Similar to our discussion on the percentage of institutional equity
holding, firms with lesser number of institutions participating in
equity tended, on average, to have lower share prices.

9.

Although to a lesser extent than for the other proxies examined,
the impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to be
captured mostly on day -1, owing to transmission of the news over the
Broad Tape.

Asquith and Mullins [1983].

10. This is significant at the 0.05 level.
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- see,

for

11.

As reported earlier the impact of the dividend initiation
announcement appears to be captured mostly on day -1.

12.

This is significant at the 0.05 level.

13.

In the IBES data set, the number of analysts following a firm in any
given month, is recorded as the "Number of Sellside Estimates".
An
official of Lynch, Jones and Ryan explained that this meant the
number of marketable analyst estimates at any given point of time.

14.

While the impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to
be captured mostly on day -1, owing to transmission of the news over
the Broad Tape, there also appears to be a sizeable leakage of
information on day -3 when the AR is 1.02% with a t-value of 2.13.

15.

Hence, the portfolio characteristics for the "medium/high" group
remain unchanged in the second stage analysis.

16.

Others, notably Patell and Wolfson [1979] and Christie [1983] have
provided similar evidence for other regular announcements.

17.

In this analysis, 17 firms not listed by IBES, are assumed to have no
analyst following.

18.

This sample includes 17 firms not listed in the IBES tapes.
assumed that these firms did not have any analyst following.

19.

Since the variable ANLST had a large number of values equal to zero,
we added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value.
This procedure has been recommended in Winer [1971, p.400],
A
similar transformation was used in Kross, Ro and Schroeder [1990].
Throughout the different stages of our analyses, we experimented by
adding other constants, such as 1 and 0.1, with largely similar
results.

20.

The coefficient for LINST is significant at the 0.20 level.

21.

A more complete discussion of the extent of correlation between the
proxy measures follows in Section 6.5.

22.

This sample excludes the 17 firms, not listed in the IBES tapes, on
the premise that there is insufficient information about the extent
of analyst following on these firms.

23.

The coefficient for LINST is significant at the 0.20 level, although,
again, its value is less than the value reported in Table 30.

24.

This sample was comprised of firm-events for which the Number of
Analysts Following exceeded 1 and the mean and standard deviation of
analysts earnings forecasts, in the month prior to dividend
initiation, were positive.
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We

25.

LANLST here is the natural log of the untransformed variable ANLST,
as none of the observations pertaining to the ANLST variable are zero
in this sample.

26.

A more complete discussion of the extent of correlation between the
proxy measures follows in Section 6.5.

27.

The variable DISP is not included here.

28.

This sample includes 17 firms, not included in the IBES tapes,
which the Number of Analysts Following is assumed to be zero.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

7.1

Summary of Findings
Consistent with evidence documented in earlier studies by Asquith

and Mullins [1983],

Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989],

our

results show that dividend initiation announcements are associated with
highly significant abnormal returns.

Most of this abnormal return is

concentrated on the day before the dividend initiation announcement is
reported in the Wall Street Journal,
our "firm-event" observations,

suggesting that for a majority of

the news gets transmitted over the Broad

Tape on this day.
Our analysis with the six information environment proxy measures
indicates that the association between abnormal returns and dividend
initiation announcements appears to be much stronger for the "low"
information environment firms than for the "medium/high" information
environment firms,
proxies,

more so in the context of the MKT.

CAP and INST

and to a lesser extent for the ANLST and NINST proxies.

The

event period returns volatility measures also show increments of over 1.5
times relative to estimation period volatilities for the "low information
environment" firms,
proxies.

However,

in the context of the INST,

MKT.CAP and NINST

for the "medium/high" information environment firms,

average event period returns variances are actually lower than average
estimation period variances for the MKT.

CAP and NINST proxies and

approximately the same for the INST proxy.

Such differences in results,

between "low" and "medium/high" firms, are not observed for the ANLST
proxy.

Hence,

with the exception of the ANLST proxy,
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the results of the

volatility analysis discussed in section 6.2 appear to be generally
supportive of the evidence from the abnormal returns analysis discussed
in sections 6.1 and 6.3.
Three sets of univariate and multivariate regression models are
tested in the study.

While all the models have,

in common,

the natural

logs of the information environment proxy variables and the dividend
yield as independant variables,
dependant variable.

they have differed with respect to the

The first regression model has the actual value of

the event period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return as the dependant
variable.

The regression results indicate that MKT.

CAP is the most

powerful explanatory proxy of the information environment among those
examined.

INST,

ANLST and NINST also appear to be good proxies.

The

second regression model involves analysis with the absolute value of the
Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return whereas the third model contains
only the positive event period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return
observations.

From the latter two models,

MKT.

CAP appears to be even

stronger as an information environment proxy variable whereas the
explanatory power of the INST proxy is somewhat weakened,
results reported in the first regression model.

MKT.

relative to the

CAP clearly appears

to be the dominant independant variable from our findings.

Since the

total number of dividend initiation observations in our study is 80,

to

some extent our findings may be sample specific.
A shortcoming of our analysis with the ANLST variable is that we
did not have data on the Number of Analysts Following for 17, out of a
total of 80,

"firm-event" observations.

Hence a two stage procedure was

followed in our analysis with regard to this proxy.
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In the first stage,

all 80 "firm-events" were included in the analysis and we assumed that
the 17 firms,

for which data was not available,

In the second stage,

had no analyst following.

we excluded the 17 firms on the premise that there

was insufficient information about the extent of analyst following for
these firms.

From our discussions in the context of the Abnormal Returns

study given in Section 6.1.2.5,

the Volatility study reported in

Section 6.2 and the Regression analysis given in Section 6.3,

we find

that the results for the second stage analysis have been consistently
stronger.

While this appears to indicate that the Number of Analysts

Following is a powerful explanatory proxy for the firm’s information
environment,

this conclusion might have been further reinforced had data

been available for all 80 "firm-events" in our sample.
Our examination of the DISP proxy was also constrained by
limitations of data availability.

Since this proxy attempts to capture

differences of beliefs amongst analysts,

it can only be studied in the

context of firms for which the Number of Analysts Following exceeds one.
Moreover,

since this proxy involves computing the coefficient of

variation of analysts’

earnings forecasts,

it entails that the mean and

standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts be non-zero and
positive entities.

Given these constraints,

our analysis of the DISP

proxy was conducted with a modest sample of 26 "firm-event" observations.
Consequently,

our examination was confined to regression analysis.

While the results of these regressions appear to be encouraging,

any

interpration of the findings is considerably weakened by the modest
sample of 26 observations.

The results,
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however, certainly call for

subsequent investigation of this variable’s potential role as a proxy,
with larger samples.
The results with respect to the R

2

proxy are never strong,

and

contrast with Richardson’s [1984] encouraging findings in the context of
earnings announcements.

In general,

namely market capitalization,
holding,

four of the six proxies examined -

the percentage of institutional equity

the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity,

and the

number of analysts following - appear to be powerful indicators of the
firm’s information environment.

The dispersion of analysts’ earnings

forecasts is also potentially a good,
Overall,

qualitative proxy variable.

the explanatory power of the market capitalization proxy appears

to be the strongest.

7.2

Contribution of Study
A voluminious number of academic studies have sought to

empirically examine the "dividend signalling" hypothesis.

Much of the

evidence provided in these studies appears to indicate that dividend
initiations convey unanticipated information to the market,
dividend policy is,

therefore,

and that

at least perceived to be relevant to firm-

valuation.
The major objective of this study is to examine whether
similar initial dividend payments have differing implications for
firm-valuation,
respect,

depending on the firm’s information-environment.

In this

the study provides further direct evidence of the

"dividend-signalling" hypothesis on the premise that the hypothesized
announcement effects will occur only if investors impute a "signalling"
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value to the dividend.

To the best of our knowledge,

our study is the

first attempt to examine the informational effects of dividend
initiation announcements in the context of the firm’s information
environment.

Recent studies by Mangiero [1988],

Seifert [1988] and Brown,

Eddy and

Choi and Kim [1989] have sought to examine the

informational effects of regular dividend announcements in the context of
asymmetrical information environments.

All three studies have used

market capitalization (or size) to proxy for the information environment.
By focussing our investigation on dividend initiations rather than
regular dividend announcements we have made two important new
contributions to the existing body of literature on dividend issues
1) We have provided results which are not subject to the controversy
generated by the findings of Bajaj and Vijh [1990].

Bajaj and Vijh

examine the market’s response to all regular dividend announcements
without any ex-post selection and document significantly higher
positive excess returns for smaller firms.

The authors view their

findings as anomalous in the light of existing theories of asset
pricing.

Indeed,

Bajaj and Vijh’s evidence does,

to some extent,

tone

down the conclusion of greater informational effects of regular
dividend announcements for smaller firms documented in Eddy and Seifert
[1988].

The premise of this study,

however,

is that the anomalous

findings of Bajaj and Vijh should not apply to dividend initiations,
since these events,

unlike subsequent regular dividend announcements,

are not regular or predictable occurrances.
2) A difficulty commonly encountered by empirical studies on regular
dividend announcements has been to adequately isolate and control for
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investor expectations.

By examining dividend initiations,

attempted to mitigate this problem.

we have

The dividend initiating firms in

our sample do not have any prior record of cash dividend payments.
Hence,

for this sample,

the naive model should reflect investors’

expectations much better than for subsequent regular dividend changes.
Moreover,

since dividend initiations are rare events,

dividend effects should be most visible at initiation,

any hypothesized
on the premise

that these announcements are more likely to be unexpected than
subsequent regular cash dividend announcements (Asquith and Mullins
[1983]).
The findings of the study appear to reinforce the "dividend
signalling" argument.

In this context,

the implications of alternate theories,
argument.

it would be pertinent to analyze
particularly the tax-clientele

If tax clienteles are relevant,

then the initiation of

dividend payments should induce a change in clienteles - specifically,
from high tax bracket investors to low tax bracket investors.
shifts of this nature,

however,

Clientele

do not explain why the market’s reaction

to dividend initiation announcements by "low information environment"
firms should be systematically higher than its reaction to similar
announcements by "medium and high information environment" firms.
Our study has,

for the first time,

addressed the issue of whether

the volatility of security price reaction to a dividend initiation
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information
environment.

In general,

we feel that our findings make an important

contribution to the existing body of empirical literature on the
volatility of security returns.

For instance,
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studies by Patel 1 and

Wolfson [1979],

Christie [1983] and Kalay and Lowenstein [1985] report

that stock returns are more volatile around regularly scheduled
announcements,
events.

due to high levels of uncertainty surrounding these

Specifically,

the Kalay and Lowenstein [1985] study examines

regular cash dividend announcements.
in general,

Our findings indicate that while,

the volatility of security returns does increase sizeably at

the time of dividend initiation announcements by "low information
environment" firms,

such increases in "event period" returns volatility

are not found for the "medium/high information environment" firms with
respect to three proxies for the information environment examined.
fact,

for the "medium/high information environment" firms,

In

average event

period returns variances are actually lower than average estimation
period variances for the market capitalization and number of institutions
holding firm-equity proxies and approximately the same for the percentage
of institutional equity holding proxy.
dividend initiations,

we feel,

Based on our findings for

that the firm’s information environment

may have a significant impact on the behaviour pattern of the volatility
of security returns around other corporate announcements.
Finally,

the testing of "unanticipated" dividend initiation

announcement effects in the light of the six information environment
proxies has served a dual purpose
i)

It has enabled us to identify a relation between the market reaction
to the dividend initiation and the firm-specific proxy variables whose
values are known prior to the announcement.

Examining price reaction

and volatility together has strengthened our analysis since the
hypotheses predict corroborative evidence.
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ii) This has also enabled us to understand and identify the variables
which define the firm’s information environment more effectively thus
providing useful,

7.3

normative decision rules.

Avenues for Further Research

A number of additional hypotheses,

pertaining to the information

content of dividend initiations as well as the firm’s information
environment can be formulated and tested.

First,

an examination of the

temporal breakup of the sample of dividend initiations detailed in Table
1,

shows a sizeable clustering of firm-events in the years 1976,

1987.

1977 and

It may be noted that legislation pertaining to tax law changes in

1986 immediately preceded the dividend initiations in 1987.

The

clustering of dividend initiations in the years 1976 and 1977 could also
have been motivated,
would,

therefore,

at least in part,

by some macro economic event.

It

be interesting to investigate whether there are

systematic differences in the market’s reaction to dividend initiations
which are motivated by macro economic issues and initiations which are
not so motivated.

We conducted a preliminary examination,

dividend initiation announcements of 1976,

wherein the

1977 and 1987 were grouped in

one portfolio (comprising of 42 firm-events) and the announcements for
the years 1978 to 1986 were grouped in another portfolio (comprising of
38 firm-events).

Our findings do not indicate evidence of significant

differences in the market’s reaction to the firm-events in the two
portfolios.

However,

our preliminary investigation did not control for

factors such as the magnitude of dividend yield.
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We feel,

therefore,

that more rigorous analysis may provide further interesting insights into
the motivation for initiating regular dividend payments.
Studies which have found evidence of information content in
dividend initiation announcements have often disagreed about the nature
of such information.

For instance,

Asquith and Mullins [1983] and Healy

and Palepu [1988] suggest that dividend initiations may convey valuable
information regarding current and future earnings.

However,

McCann

[1987] has suggested that the initiation of dividend payments,

by

allowing the firm broader access to capital markets and lowering its cost
of capital,

is signalling not higher earnings but lower risk.

Indeed

McCann finds evidence of a significant decrease in the growth in the cash
flow per share following the initiation of dividends although investment
activity is found to increase significantly as well.
when combined with the results of this study,
questions for future investigation.

McCann’s findings,

suggest several interesting

For instance, do firms that initiate

dividend payments share certain common traits at the time of and
subsequent to the initiation?

An exploratory study into the nature of

the characteristics shared by firms at the time of initiation may
generate insights which could help to predict some generalizable
circumstances that may occur at the time of dividend initiations.

1

The association between the information content of dividend
initiation announcements and the information environment can be
investigated further in several ways.

While the focus of this study has

been the analysis of abnormal returns and volatility of returns around
dividend initiation announcements,

further examination could be extended

to studies on trading volume and the market micro structure.
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2

Yet

another extension could be a separate investigation of dividend
initiating OTC firms.
Finally,

a study could focus on the firm’s information

environment using the initiation of dividend payments as one of several
"informational events".

Such a study could not only explore several

alternative proxies for the information environment,

but also examine the

consistency in the association between the information environment and
each "informational event".
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Chapter 7 Endnotes

1.

As an example, we found that, very often, firms initiated dividend
payment soon after acquiring exchange-1isted status.

2.

Theoretically, price and volume have been shown to capture different
aspects of investors’ reactions (Beaver [1968]).
The price change is
observed when the average investor revises his beliefs in one
direction.
However, the volume reaction is observed when investors
revise their beliefs in a heterogenous manner.
Empirical evidence
(see Bamber [1986], [1987]), indicates that price changes and volume
reactions are often highly correlated.
The reason may be that when
information is released, investors usually interpret it in one
direction, but revise their expectations by different magnitudes.
While this revision of beliefs in the same direction causes a price
change, the revision by different magnitudes induces a trading volume
reaction.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND LITERATURE
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APPENDIX A 1*
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORY

Study/Subject.

Conclusion

Miller and Modigliani [1961]
/Dividend Irrelevance

Under a strict set of assumptions
dividends are irrelevant to the
value of the firm; but there may
be an information content to the
dividend.

Farrar and Selwyn [1967]
/Dividends & personal taxes

Investors have a choice between
dividends and capital gains, and
will prefer capital gains as long
as the tax rate on capital gains
is less than on personal income.

Brennan [1970]
/General Equilibrium
with dividends & taxes

With constant risk, investors
demand higher total returns on
higher yield shares, due to
higher dividend tax.

Miller & Scholes [1978]
/Tax Hedge

Investors need not pay a higher
tax rate on dividend income, and
so dividend irrelevance might hold
even with personal taxes.

Feenberg [1981]
/Test of Tax Hedge

Only about 2.5% of individuals can
make use of tax-sheltering
provision.

Peterson, Peterson and Ang [1985]
/Test of Dividend Taxes

Investors pay substantial taxes on
dividends.

* The studies have
developed

been sequenced

in Chapter

2 and not

in accordance with the subject
on a temporal

basis.
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theme

John & Kalay [1982]
/Dividends & bondholder,
stockholder agency conflicts.

Smaller dividend payouts are
better for bondholders interests,
to avoid wealth redistribution
from bondholders to stockholders.

Rozeff [1981]
/Dividend payments & managerstockholder agency issues.

"Financing" of dividend payments
may reduce agency costs. Hence
there could be a trade-off
between flotation costs of
raising external capital and the
reduced agency costs.

Easterbrook [1984]
/Dividend payments & managerstockholder agency issues.

"Financing" of dividends sends
positive signals, as it leads to
higher monitoring of the firm.
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APPENDIX A 2
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND SIGNALLING THEORIES

Study/Subject

Conclusion

Ross [1977].
/Incentive signalling
model.

The paper models types A & B firms,
where B firms have lower value after
period. Type B firms cannot afford to
signal falsely, as management
compensation is positively linked to
firm value.

Bhattacharya [1979]
/Dividend signals & taxes.

Investors are willing to pay higher
taxes to receive dividend "signals",
which convey unique information about
firm-value.

Hakansson [1982]
/General equilibrium
dividend signalling model.

For dividends to be useful "signals",
they should not only be informative
but investors should have heterogenous
beliefs and consumption attitudes, and
financial markets should be incomplete.

Miller and Rock [1985]
/Dividend signals &
financing

The "financing" of dividends sends
negative signals as it connotes
under-investing.

John and Williams [1982]
/Equilibrium dividend¬
signalling model.

Firms with more favourable inside
information optimally pay larger
dividends and realize higher prices
for their stock whenever the demand
for cash by the firm and its current
stockholders exceeds the internal
supply of cash.
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Ambarish, John and Williams [1987]
/Equilibrium with multiple
signals.

Adverse tax effects may render the
dividend an uneconomical signal,
By combining the dividend signal with
other signals, the firm may be able
to obtain a less-costly signalling mix.
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APPENDIX A 3
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND SIGNALLING

Study

Conclusion.

Fama et al.

[1969].

Stock splits do convey information
about dividend increases which in turn
signal higher future cash flows.

Pettit [1972].

There is "information content" in
dividend announcements and the market
adjusts immediately to the
announcement.

Charest [1978].

There is "information content" in
dividend announcements, but the NYSE
is slow to discount dividend
reductions suggesting market
inefficiency.

Watts

There is no information content in
dividend announcements. A problem with
his model is that it uses monthly
data, which does not allow him to
explicitly control for other events.

[1973].

Gonedes [1978].

* The studies have
developed

Current & past dividends do not improve
accuracy of forecasts of future
earnings relative to forecasts based
on only current & past earnings.
Hence, there is no information content
in dividends. This study also uses
monthly data.

been sequenced

in Chapter

: and not

in accordance with the subject
on a temporal

basis.

theme

Aharony

and

Swary

[1980]

The study uses daily data and controls
for earnings announcement effects. It
finds that dividends convey
information beyond historical
earnings.

Kalay [1980]

Most dividend cuts are not forced
through contractual arrangements.
Possibly such cuts signal management’s
need to conserve liquid funds.

Woolridge and Ghosh [1987]

While the market reacts negatively to
all cuts, it later reacts positively
to firms which cut dividends to
increase investment.

Woolridge [1983]/
Handjinicloaou and

Little evidence of "wealth transfer" in
dividend increases. Signalling effect
appears to dominate.

Kalay

[1984]

Divecha and Morse [1983]

Find that firms decreasing their
payout ratios at the time dividends
were increased had higher abnormal
returns than firms increasing their
payout ratios.

Asquith and Mullins [1983]

Dividend
initiations convey positive
signals regarding future cash flows.
Also the information content of
initiations is higher than for
subsequent regular dividends owing to
higher element of "surprise".

Richardson,

The study uses volume data. It finds
no support for the clientele effect.
Volome increases due to "signalling"
effects.

Sefcik and Thompson
[1986].

155

Kane,

Lee and Marcus [1984]

Offer and Siegel

Investors give more credence to
unexpected dividend increases or
decreases when earnings are also
above or below expectations.

[1987]

The study refutes Gonedes [1978], by
showing that security analysts revise
forecasts following unexpected
dividend changes and the magnitude of
the revision is related to the
dividend change.

Healy and Palepu [1988]

Dividend initiating firms experience
earnings growth in the year of
announcement and two subsequent years
but not thereafter.

Venkatesh

Information content of earnings
announcement is substantially lower
after the introduction of quarterly
cash dividends. This holds when
earnings announcements precede or
follow dividend announcements.

[1989]

McCann [1987]

Dividend Initiation is associated with
increased investment, due to a fall in
cost of capital rather than increased
profitability. This suggests that
dividends signal not higher earnings
but less risk.

Eddy and Seifert [1988]/
Mangiero [1988]

Information content of dividends is
negatively related to firm-size.

Brown,

(I) Information content of dividends
and earnings is negatively related
to firm-size. (II) Dividends are more
preemptive of earnings, and hence are
the more informative signal.

Choi and Kim [1989]
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Bajaj and Vijh [1990]

Document significant positive excess
returns around dividend announcement
dates. The positive excess returns are
higher for small-firm, low-priced and
high-yield stocks. These effects are
as viewed as anomalous in the light of
existing theories of asset pricing.

\
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APPENDIX A 4*

THE "DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION" LITERATURE

Study

Conclusion.

Barry and Brown [1985]

Investors demand higher returns from
low information securities due to
higher uncertainty. Hence, their
"excess" returns arise due to higher
risk.

Damodaran [1985]

The return generating process of
information deficient firms may
resemble a mixed jump-diffusion
process. Hence, stock prices
of such firms adjust less frequently
to reflect new information.

Verrechia [1979]

The amount of privately acquired
information impounded in the stock
price through trading increases as
market participation increases.

Atiase [1980]

The amount of predisclosure information
production and dissemination is an
increasing function of capitalized
firm-value.

Richardson [1984]

Institutions do not hold small firm
stocks due to liquidity problems.
Hence, analysts tend not to follow
small firms.Also different measures
of firm’s information environment are
likely to be highly correlated with
firm-size.

* The studies have
developed

been sequenced

in Chapter

2 and not

in accordance with the subject
on a temporal

basis.
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theme

Atiase [1985]

The study finds a much greater price
adjustment for quarterly earnings
announcements of small firms than of
large firms.

Freeman [1987]

The findings are similar to Atiase [1985].
security prices of large firms
anticipate accounting earnings earlier
than security prices of small firms.

Grant [1980]

There is a higher flow of prior
information for large firms between
releases of accounting reports. Many
more news items appear in WSJ for NYSE
firms than OTC firms.

Kross

and

Scroeder

[1988]

Earnings announcements convey more
information on obscure firms than on
prominent firms.

McNichols and Manegold [1982]

Report-week price reaction is higher,on
average, for firms with no quarterly
reports than for firms with quarterly
reports.

Arbel and Strebel

Neglected firms earn higher
risk-adjusted returns, even after
controlling for firm-size.

Callahan,

[1982][1983]

Elgers and Strock
[1987]

The study uses share price and analyst
following as alternative proxies for
differential information.
After
controlling for size-effect, only
analyst following is consistent with
the differential information
hypothesis.
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Bhushan

Ajinkya,

[1989]

Atiase and Gift
[1991]

Morse, Stephan and St ice
[1991]

The paper examines the major
determinants of the number of
analysts following a firm. It finds
that the variable is positively
related to the firm’s ownership
structure,size and return variability
and inversely related to the number of
lines of business of the firm.

The degree of heterogeneity in beliefs,
measured by the dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecasts, is a determinant
of the intensity of trading.

Analysts’ forecasts become more
dispersed, after earnings
announcements, than would be expected
in the absence of earnings
announcements, an earnings
announcement, due to nonsynchronous
updating of forecasts by analysts.
Partitioning the sample on the length
of time between the announcement date
and the next IBES report provides a
more accurate measure of changes in
the dispersion of forecasts due to an
earnings announcement.
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